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Executive summary 
The key objectives of this analysis are: 
 to quantitatively explore the medium and long-term potential (up to 2040) 
development of unconventional hydrocarbons (UH) – namely unconventional gas 
and oil and their by-products – at global scale;  
 to assess its possible impacts on the European market.  
Policy context 
Global energy markets have recently undergone remarkable changes, some of which are 
strictly linked to the so called “unconventional revolution”. The sharp development of 
unconventional oil and gas in the United States during the last few years has radically 
changed perspectives about its import dependency outlooks and created new oil and gas 
markets dynamics. 
On another hand, due to growing worldwide concerns regarding anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system, 188 countries have, since December 2015, 
committed to the Paris Agreement that stated that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions are required so as to hold the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5 °C. In this respect, the European Union (EU) has 
committed to achieve a 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 relative to 1990 levels 
and aim to a long-term emissions reduction to between 80% and 95% by the year 2050, 
relative to 1990 levels. 
Under these transition perspectives, this report aims to investigate the potential role of 
unconventional oil and gas in the future worldwide energy systems, and their implications 
for the European markets. The analysis may be seen as an update and follow-up of the 
previous JRC analysis published in (Pearson et al., 2012). However, this report has 
extended the scope of the analysis to i) both unconventional oil and gas (previously only 
shale gas), and ii) both global and EU regional dynamics (previously only global focus). 
Key conclusions 
During the past few years a number of studies have discussed the potential impact of 
unconventional oil and gas on global energy markets. However, only few studies are 
underpinned by a model-based analysis and had a specific focus on implications for 
Europe. This report uses the global energy system model JRC Energy Trade Model (JRC 
ETM) to explore the medium and long-term implications of the worldwide increased 
development of unconventional gas and oil and their by-products on global and European 
markets.  
The analysis has been developed in two phases. First a detailed analysis of the current 
and past oil and gas markets dynamics identifies the key drivers which underpin the 
development of the UH globally and ultimately in the EU. Secondly a scenario analysis 
assesses the role of the following key variables in the current and future energy markets: 
a) regional distribution of UH production and its exploitation costs; b) infrastructure; c) 
interregional trades; and d) global policies (post-COP climate policies).  
The study explains how the reciprocal effects of substitutions on both the supply and 
demand-side play an important role in constraining or enabling the penetration of 
unconventional resources, by illustrating the chain of actions and feedbacks induced by 
different economics of unconventional fuels, their magnitude, their relative importance, 
and the necessary conditions for the global potential to be realized. 
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Main findings 
From the analysis, the following headline messages can be gained: 
 The natural gas market will expand in the future years and will contribute –
replacing other more carbon intensive fossil fuels – to the decarbonisation of 
energy sectors.  
 Under scenarios with favourable unconventional gas development, natural gas has 
the potential of capturing 30% of the world’s total primary energy supply by 
2040. This would make it surpass oil as the world’s foremost source of energy. 
 Natural gas in Europe can be considered as transition fuel towards a low carbon 
economy. 
 Unconventional gas is relatively evenly dispersed around the world and many 
regions will likely witness at least some level of production in the future. In 
scenarios with favourable unconventional gas development, the USA, China and 
Other Developing Asia are well placed to become the top producers of 
unconventional gas. In EU-28, the exploitation of unconventional gas resources is 
driven by emissions targets. Stricter mitigation policies drive to low extraction 
activity. UK and, with a lesser extent, Germany are the regions where most of 
these extractions take place. 
 Significant unconventional gas production has the potential to lower the natural 
gas prices. 
 The global trade in natural gas will increase in any scenario. Unconventional gas 
development, however, has the potential to moderate the growth of pipeline 
trades, while increasing interregional LNG flows. 
 Global oil market will expand in the medium term in all scenarios, then from 2040 
tighter mitigation policies may drive to a decline. In these scenarios, oil reduces to 
16-17% of the world’s total primary energy supply. Unconventional oil production 
will be only slightly impacted by mitigation policies, i.e. the relative share grows 
to 60-62% of total oil production by 2040.  
 Unconventional oil production will grow in the future years, but has limited 
potential on lowering oil prices. Canada and Latin America are well placed to 
become the top producers of unconventional oil. The EU-28 exploitation of 
unconventional oil will be very limited. 
 The global trade in crude oil will increase in any scenario at least in the medium 
term (till 2030). Climate policies have the potential of reducing the growth of 
trades from 2040 on. 
Quick guide 
This report is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the analysis. Section 2 is 
intended to guide the reader through an overview of past and current oil and gas 
markets dynamics, with a particular focus on the role of unconventional hydrocarbons. 
Section 3 presents the methodology used to identify the critical variables and define the 
scenarios. Section 4 provides a detailed description of the modelling analysis and the key 
results. Section 5 draws some conclusions. 
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1 Introduction 
This report is part of the consultancy service provided by E4SMA S.r.l. for DG JRC 
Directorate C Energy, Transport and Climate within the tender 
JRC/PTT/2015/F.3/0056/NC titled “Study on the economic impacts on energy markets 
from the worldwide and potential European exploitation of unconventional gas and oil”. 
This work is an update of a previous work carried on by the European Commission (EC) 
in 2012 (Pearson et al., 2012). Some details of the improvements brought about by this 
more recent study compared to the 2012 version are given in Box 1. 
The key objectives of the present study are: 
 to quantitatively explore the medium and long-term potential (up to 2040) 
development UH – namely unconventional gas and oil and their by-products – at 
global scale;  
 to assess its possible impacts on the European market.  
The study explores the medium and long-term implications of the worldwide increased 
development of unconventional gas and oil and their by-products on European market. 
The analysis has been developed through a detailed analysis of the current and past oil 
and gas markets dynamics, and a review of key drivers which underpin the development 
of the UH globally and ultimately in the EU. The analysis also quantitatively explores the 
potential development of unconventional resources at global scale, and its possible 
impacts on energy markets. A scenario analysis investigates the way a set of key 
variables interact with the global and European energy markets, and assesses how the 
global potential for unconventional gas and oil development is contingent to these. 
The report assesses the role of the following key variables in the current and future 
energy markets: a) regional distribution of UH production and its exploitation costs; b) 
infrastructure; c) interregional trades; and d) global policies (post-COP climate policies). 
The study explores how the reciprocal effects of substitutions on both the supply and 
demand-side play an important role in constraining or enabling the penetration of 
unconventional resources, by illustrating the chain of actions and feedbacks induced by 
different economics of unconventional fuels, their magnitude, their relative importance, 
and the necessary conditions for the global potential to be realized. 
The analysis has been developed using the DG JRC Directorate C in-house global energy 
system model, the JRC Energy Trade Model (JRC ETM). The JRC ETM links two multi-
regional models – the global TIMES Integrated Assessment Model (ETSAP-TIAM) 
(Gracceva and Zeniewski, 2015, 2014, 2013; IEA-ETSAP, n.d.; Loulou and Labriet, 2008) 
and the European JRC-EU-TIMES (JET) model (Sgobbi et al., 2016, 2015, Simoes et al., 
2017, 2013; Thiel et al., 2016) – explicitly representing energy dynamics for 44 separate 
regions of the world made of 13 macro-regions (1) and 31 European countries. One of the 
strengths on this set up is that it describes global dynamics on the basis of a new 
detailed representation of input data referring to the European context. The JRC ETM 
provides a range of energy system configurations, each one delivering projected energy 
service demand requirements optimised to least cost and subject to a range of policy 
constraints for the period up to 2040. It provides a mean to assess the impacts of energy 
policy choices and scenarios with respect to: a) the economy (technology choices, prices, 
output, etc.); b) the energy mix; and c) the carbon emissions.  
As stated in the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC, 2011), forecasting the long-term future 
is not possible. The purpose of this analysis is not to predict the future but to explore 
possible routes towards future energy systems, with a focus on economic impacts and 
the potential European exploitation of unconventional hydrocarbons. The report provides 
                                           
(1) In this case a macro-region is a geographical area that consists either of one country (as in the case of the 
United States (USA)) or of more than one country (as in the case of Other Developing Asia (ODA) that 
includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, North Korea, Malaysia, 
Mongolia Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, and others. All 
the regions and acronyms of the JRC ETM are in the list of abbreviations.  
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insights on the timing in which changes in the fuel mix are likely to occur, the coming of 
new technologies, the future role of UH and the oil and gas infrastructure. It also 
emphasizes the scale of the challenge ahead and points to a number of areas of 
opportunity for Europe as it shifts to a low-carbon future. This analysis does not stipulate 
which policies are necessary to achieve the energy transitions; it rather focuses on the 
implications for the energy system to move towards future energy targets. 
This report is structured as follows. Section 2 is intended to guide the reader through an 
overview of past and current oil and gas markets dynamics, with a particular focus on the 
role of unconventional hydrocarbons. Section 3 presents the methodology used to 
identify the critical variables and define the scenarios. Section 4 provides a detailed 
description of the modelling methodology (section 4.1); the data collection and the 
implementation of the scenarios within the model JRC Energy Trade Model (section 4.2); 
and the results analysis (section 4.3). Section 5 draws some conclusions. 
Box 1. Comparison with previous JRC analysis 
In 2012 the DG JRC-IET (today named DG JRC Directorate C Energy, Transport and 
Climate) developed a comprehensive analysis on the potential energy market impacts of 
the unconventional gas in the EU (Pearson et al., 2012). While both reports develop an 
own scenario analysis, based on the same modelling paradigm (the TIMES modelling 
framework (see box 3 in section 4.1 for details)), the present report includes various 
updates (i.e. the modelling of the global trade of the biomass, based in part on (Castello 
et al., 2015) and some relevant extensions on UH that can be summarized as follows: 
 While both analyses provide and update the latest key gas market dynamics, this 
report updates these findings to latest trends and extends the discussion to oil 
market;  
 Previous modelling analysis was developed using the global ETSAP-TIAM model. 
This report drawn its findings using the JRC ETM, which expands the modelling 
capability of the previous analysis, as it combines strength of the ETSAP-TIAM 
model on assessing global dynamics with the detailed geographical representation 
of European regions of the JET model (see section 4.1 for details); 
 Previous analysis has been focused to potential market impacts of unconventional 
gas, namely shale gas, tight gas and coal-bed methane. This report extends the 
focus of the analysis also to unconventional oils, such tight oil, extra-heavy oil and 
oil sand; 
 Cost assessments in this report have been based on elaborations drawn from 
publicly available literature analysis and information made available directly from 
JRC Directorate C experts. Previous analysis has developed some own estimates. 
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2 Oil and gas markets dynamics 
Global energy markets have recently undergone remarkable changes, some of which are 
strictly linked to the so called “unconventional revolution”, i.e. the sharp development of 
unconventional oil and gas in the United States (US) during the last few years. This 
analysis investigates the potential role of unconventional oil and gas in the future energy 
system and its potential impact on global energy markets.  
Recent studies have discussed the potential impact of unconventional oil and gas on 
global energy markets. However, only a few of them were grounded on model based 
analyses and had a focus on the potential impact on the EU (IEA, 2012; Pearson et al., 
2012; POYRY, 2013). A common result of these different analysis is that only a limited 
impact can be expected from the deployment of shale gas in the EU: on average, EU 
production by 2030-2035 is estimated to reach a few tens of billions of cubic metres 
(bcm), a level too low to have for instance a substantial impact on EU import dependency 
(Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Table 1. Comparison between JRC and IEA projections  
 
Source: (IEA, 2012; Pearson et al., 2012) 
 
Figure 1. EU28 gas import dependency from POYRY 2013 scenario analysis 
 
 
Source: own elaboration on (POYRY, 2013) 
These results do not imply that the impact of unconventional gas and oil on the EU 
market will be necessarily negligible. It is still possible that potential effects can arise 
from the radical changes in the development of equilibrium of global oil and gas markets, 
as EU prices are largely determined by international import prices due to first, a different 
trajectory of global prices; second to less tight and more liquid markets and a stronger 
position in negotiating with suppliers. Indeed, global oil and gas markets have already 
undergone impressive changes recently. Some changes are directly linked to the 
development of unconventional gas and oil, while some others are indirect effects of UH. 
Moreover, some changes are contingent, while others can be structural, at least for a 
while. 
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The next section of the report (section 2.1) analyses the recent changes in the oil and 
gas markets and discusses to what extent these characteristics are linked to the 
development of shale gas and light tight oil (LTO) in the US. Section 2.2 describes some 
new relevant characteristics which have emerged recently in both markets and discusses 
some conditions under which some of the effects produced so far from the development 
of UH can become the new stylized facts characterizing future energy markets: in short, 
a world of large supply of energy resources and interconnected and flexible oil and gas 
markets with less market power of traditional producers.  
2.1 Story of unconventional hydrocarbons: the recent changes in 
oil and gas markets 
Few key facts have characterized energy markets in recent years. The change has been 
so impressive that it is worth investigating if new relevant characteristics have emerged 
in the oil and gas markets. Moreover, we analyse how the development of UH has 
directly affected so far the current equilibrium of energy markets, and how their further 
development could have a long-lasting effect in the future. 
2.1.1 Natural gas markets 
A first big change has been the impressive reduction of US gas prices since 2008 – as a 
direct consequence result of the growth in the production of shale gas – while gas prices 
in the other main two regional markets, i.e. Europe and Asia-Pacific, followed a 
completely different and divergent path. Figure 2 shows the huge and steep increase of 
shale gas production in the US since the middle of the last decade. In parallel, the 
trajectory of natural gas prices at the US market (Henry Hub) has suddenly decoupled 
from the trajectory of the other main global markets (Figure 3). 
Figure 2. U.S. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals 
and Production (MMcf) 
Figure 3. Natural gas prices ($/MBtu) 
  
Source: own elaborations on EIA data (EIA, 2016a) Source: (BP, 2015) 
The shale gas boom in the US had an impressive impact on the projections of natural gas 
import in the USA: according to the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) prepared by the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2004 US imports were expected to double 
within the next decade. These projections have been constantly revisited in all the 
subsequent AEOs. In the AEO 2014 (DoE, 2014) it is foreseen a net export increasing up 
to about 150 bcm by 2030 (Figure 4). Figure 5 and below show how this change had an 
impact on natural gas flows between energy markets: by 2014 there are no more 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) flows towards North America. 
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Figure 4. Projections of US net imports of natural gas (bcm) 
 
Source: own elaborations on (EIA, 2016b) data (Annual Energy Outlooks 2003-2016)  
 
Figure 5. Major natural gas trade flows in 2007 (bcm) 
 
Source: (BP, 2008) 
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Figure 6. Natural gas flows in 2014 (bcm) 
 
Source: (BP, 2015) 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets have quickly transitioned from extreme tightness to 
oversupply. As a consequence, there has been a substantial decline of natural gas prices 
in both the European and the Asian market, together with the narrowing of the price 
difference between these two regional markets. Asian spot liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
prices peaked at around 18$/MBtu early in 2014, then collapsed to less than half these 
levels by mid-2015, thanks to the wide amount of LNG plants coming online or expected 
to do so soon. Oil-linked import prices across the region took a similar pathway, as they 
followed (with a time lag) the fall in oil prices. The result has been a significant narrowing 
of the divergence between gas prices in different regional gas markets experienced since 
2010 (Figure 7). In fact, the price in North America remains well below the level of the 
other two regions, however the difference can be explained through the cost of 
transportation. 
Figure 7. Natural gas price – three main markets ($/MBtu) 
 
Source: own elaborations on EIA data 
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Figure 8. Correlation between oil and gas price movements in different markets 
 
Note: the figure shows the correlation between monthly natural gas price movements and oil price (with a five-
month time lag), measured over consecutive three-year periods. 
Source: (IEA, 2015a) 
A second important change to the familiar characteristics of global gas market has been 
the progressive increase of gas contracts indexed to spot prices, as opposed to the 
traditional dominance of long-term contracts indexed to oil price, and the expectation 
that the future increase of non-oil indexed supply could strengthen this trend (8). After 
the decoupling between oil and gas prices in the US market, following the sudden 
development of internal resources, the correlation between oil and gas price movements 
became much lower in the European market as well. 
Moreover, there is now a general expectation that these changes will be reinforced by the 
forthcoming US LNG export and the parallel continuing improvement in the US net trade 
oil balance. In 2008 it was expected that LNG would soon start to flow towards North 
America, USA in particular (Figure 9), while a few years later the expectation about the 
future scenario was dramatically different: the World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2008 (IEA, 
2008) projected an increase of US net import, while the World Energy Outlook 2015 (IEA, 
2015a) foresees a strong net export already within the next decade. 
Figure 9. Main net inter-regional natural gas trade flows in reference scenario, 
2006 2030 (bcm/year) 
 
Source: (IEA, 2008) 
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Figure 10. Natural gas net export by region (bcm/year) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from (IEA, 2015a) 
The new low-price environment affected the US shale gas industry much less than 
expected, thanks to the remarkable ability of US oil and gas industry to absorb shocks 
through continuous improvements in extraction technologies. Three underlying conditions 
have been identified behind the strong growth of US shale gas output even while prices 
remained in the 2-4 $/MBtu range: “the industry’s ability to increase the average amount 
of gas produced per well, while also bringing down costs by reducing drilling times and 
optimising other above-ground processes. : “the industry’s ability to increase the average 
amount of gas produced per well, while also bringing down costs by reducing drilling 
times and optimising other above-ground processes; the operators’ capacity to zoom in 
on the most productive “sweet spots” in a play, via an intensive process of learning-by-
doing, alongside increasingly sophisticated seismic mapping techniques; a switch […] to 
more liquids-rich parts of the resource base, with natural gas liquids becoming an 
integral part of the business case for exploiting gas plays” (IEA, 2015a). 
Indeed, US Natural Gas Marketed Production increased by 7.6% in 2014 (the same 
growth observed in 2011, record year since 1990), by a further 4.6% in 2015 (Figure 2). 
Between 2013 and 2015 the additional output reached 80 bcm, that is the incremental 
volume observed between 2010 and 2013. All the production growth came from shale 
gas wells. Since 2013 shale gas wells account for more natural gas production than any 
other type of well. In 2015, shale gas wells provided almost 50% of the 400 bcm of gas 
produced in the United States. Clearly, even if producers’ cash flows are falling, the 
flexible nature of the US gas supply chain has allowed the industry to adjust to the 
changing market conditions: the impact on gas drilling programmes has been reduced by 
the producers’ ability to pass the profits’ squeeze downstream; moreover, service costs 
have already dropped by about 15%, and further substantial reductions are likely (IEA, 
2015b).  
In fact, in 2015 the low-price environment started having an impact, as there has been a 
dramatic decline in the number of rigs. In the Marcellus shale area, which is by far the 
region producing the highest amount of shale gas, the number of rigs had already 
declined in 2012, but then it flattened at a level of about 80 rigs per month until the end 
of 2014 (Figure 11). During 2015 the number of rigs had a further substantial reduction, 
down to less than 40 rigs per month. However, during all these years the production per 
rig, kept increasing, not only in the Marcellus region, but in every region (Figure 12). 
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Figure 11. Rig count – Marcellus shale area 
 
Source: own elaborations on EIA data (EIA, 2016c)  
 
Figure 12. US Natural gas - Production per rig (Mcf) 
 
Source: own elaborations on EIA data (EIA, 2016c) 
 
As result of the continuous improvement in drilling productivity, in the first quarter of 
2016 total production of natural gas was higher than in the first quarter of the previous 
years in four regions (Bakken, Marcellus, Permian and Utica), while it was stable in the 
others (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. US Natural gas production - main regions (Mcf) 
 
Source: own elaborations on EIA data (EIA, 2016c) 
The consequence of these developments is that price conditions look now considerably 
more favourable for consumers, and consequently much more challenging for those 
contemplating new long-term investments in supply. At the beginning of 2016 there was 
still a downward descent into a new phase of global oversupply and price convergence. 
There are several factors behind this new market environment, both on the supply and 
the demand side, whose relative importance is not easy to detect. On one hand, the low 
levels of European gas demand, challenged by the hard competition from renewables and 
the slowing down of demand in China: after the remarkable growth of about 15% per 
year on average from 2008 to 2013, gas demand increased by 9.6% in 2014 and by 
4.7% in 2015 (due to the easing of economic growth and the rapid rise of hydropower 
and other renewables).  
On the other hand, surplus LNG cargoes continue to flow into Europe as a market of last 
resort, with ongoing weakness in Asian demand, and almost 50 bcm per annum of new 
LNG liquefaction capacity expected to be commissioned by 2016. As these volumes ramp 
up, they should translate into higher European LNG import volumes (Timera Energy, 
2016). Moreover, the decline in oil prices is still flowing through into lower long term oil-
indexed European pipeline and Asian LNG contract prices, due to their time lags. 
Obviously, the significant development of shale gas in the US is not the only factor, still 
the remarkable growth of gas production in the US, despite continued low wholesale 
prices, is something which has the potential to change the market in a structural way 
(see section 2.2.2). 
2.1.2 International oil market 
Similarly to what happened in the natural gas production, the international oil market has 
changed after the “shale revolution” (2) in the US. Figure 14 shows the huge and steep 
increase of oil production in the US, mainly driven by the tremendous growth of tight oil, 
which increased from about 2 Mbbl/day in 2012 to about 5 Mbbl/day in 2015. As a 
consequence, the total oil production increased from about 6 Mbbl/day in 2012 to more 
than 10 Mbbl/day in 2015. This figure is even more striking when this trajectory is 
compared with the projections reported in the Annual Energy Outlook 2011 (EIA, 2011). 
                                           
(2) The term “Shale Revolution” has often been associated to the combination of hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling that enabled the United States to significantly increase its production of oil and natural 
gas, particularly from shale gas and tight oil formations. The new production capacity has had a 
tremendous impact on oil and gas trade flows towards the United States’. The shale revolution has been 
defined (by Edward Morse, head of commodity research at Citigroup) “the most politically disruptive factor 
in the global oil market since the formation of OPEC in 1960” (Crooks, 2015). 
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Figure 14. US oil production, Mbbl (historical data + projections). AEO 2015 vs AEO 2011  
 
Source: own elaborations on (EIA 2011 and EIA, 2015) 
Similarly to what happened in the natural gas market, following the steep increase of LTO 
production in the US, oil flows between energy markets changed in a substantial way in 
just a few years (Figure 15 and Figure 16). 
Figure 15. Major oil world trade movements, 2007 (M tonnes) 
 
Source: (BP, 2008) 
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Figure 16. Major world oil trade movements, 2014 (M tonnes) 
 
Source: (BP, 2015) 
 
These changes had also a significant impact on the expectation about future global oil 
flows: according to the International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2013 (EIA, 2013), in 2030 
OECD Americas was expected to be a net importer for about 5 Mbbl/day (Figure 17); 
after just three years, the IEO 2016 (EIA, 2016d) projects OECD Americas to be a net 
exporter, even if for just a tiny amount. In general, OECD imports are now projected to 
be significantly smaller, but the key factor behind this change is the rapid growth of 
indigenous production in the US. On the other hand, the projected import of non-OECD 
countries has been increased by about 8 Mbbl/day, due to stronger expectations about oil 
demand in Central and South America, Africa and Asia (other than China, whose demand 
is now expected lower than in 2013). 
Figure 17. Net import in 2030, Mbbl/day. IEO 2016 vs IEO 2013  
 
Source: own elaborations on EIA data (EIA, 2016d, 2013) 
These changes, both in the current oil market situation and in the expected evolution of 
the market, were the factors behind the complete upheaval of the oil market that 
occurred between 2014 and 2015. In just about six months, oil prices have more than 
halved. The average of the spot prices of the reference quality for the US (West Texas 
Intermediate, WTI - Cushing) has fallen from $106 a barrel in late June 2014 to values 
slightly higher than $45 a barrel in late January 2015 (Figure 18), the second steepest 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
 OECD
Americas
  United
States
 OECD
Europe
 OECD
Asia
   Total
OECD
   Total
non-OECD
IEO 2013
IEO 2016
17 
decline in the last 50 years after the one following the financial crisis of 2008. A further 
message emerging from Figure 18 is that the price collapse was much stronger and 
steepest than the slight reduction assumed in the futures contracts (3). 
Figure 18. WTI spot and NYMEX future prices (01/2014 - 09/2015) ($/bbl) 
 
Source: own elaborations on (EIA, 2016e)  
The price collapse primarily reflects a situation of excess supply on the spot market, 
fuelled by strong growth in US crude oil extracted using unconventional techniques. 
However, differently from past oil drops, this one has been driven by events both on the 
supply and the demand side: on one hand, an acceleration in supply much stronger than 
expected, notably from North America; on the other hand, a slower than expected 
demand growth. 
A brief analysis of the dynamics of supply and demand in the period before and after the 
price fall is a good starting point to trace the causes of the price collapse, as well as to 
understand the structural factors that can drive the future development of the oil market.  
On the demand side, between 2000 and 2014 the world's daily oil consumption grew by 
15.2 Mbbl/d. More than a third of the increase came from China, whose demand more 
than doubled over the period (from 4.6 to 10.3 Mbbl/d). Considering the entire emerging 
Asia, the growth rate of demand explains two thirds of the total increase. Now the overall 
share of emerging economies in global consumption has surpassed that of advanced 
economies. In the second half of 2014 the picture changed. Due to the slowing down of 
economic growth in emerging countries, as well as the persistent slow growth on some 
advanced regions, the expectations about the future oil demand growth were revised 
downward several times (Figure 19). 
Figure 19. Revision of IEA oil demand forecasts over previous year, Mbbl/day  
 
Source: own elaborations on IEA data (IEA, 2014a)  
                                           
(3) Indicated as dotted line in the graph  
18 
On the supply side, the key factor is clearly the shale oil revolution in the US. The boom 
of American shale oil, despite the limits imposed on its exports, has had a strong impact 
on the world market, significantly reducing the dependence of the United States from 
imported oil: between 2010 and 2015 US oil imports decreased from 9 Mbbl/day to 4 
Mbbl/day, a significant part of which were from the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). In the same period there has been an increase in the US 
exports of petroleum products, favoured by a negative price differential between WTI and 
the reference qualities for Europe and Asia and the widening of US refining capacity. In 
conclusion, more than 4 Mbbl, once absorbed by the US economy, have flowed on the 
international oil markets to meet the demand of the remaining consumer countries. The 
US are still net importers of crude oil, but are now net exporters of petroleum products 
(4).  
As a result of this situation of international markets, OPEC producers were convinced 
they could not defend price levels by managing production levels, so in November 2014 
they took the decision to leave their production unchanged, with the goal to leave the 
task of finding a new market equilibrium to the higher cost non-OPEC countries, 
therefore leaving the oil price acting as mediator. The underlying assumption was that 
non-OPEC production could not be sustained for long in a low-price environment. As a 
consequence, in the second half of 2015 oil prices fell to 30 $/bbl.  
Basically, the “shale revolution” in the US contributed, together with the factors on the 
demand side discussed above, to a shift in the geopolitics of oil, making it convenient for 
OPEC to let the prices remain at moderate levels in the medium term, so as to curb the 
expansion of US production, which is characterized by higher costs, rather than 
continuing to reduce its share of global supply in order to keep prices at higher levels.  
The long-term effects of the OPEC strategy on the equilibrium of the international oil 
market will depend on its actual capability to affect LTO production in the US as well as 
the economic and political sustainability of this strategy for the OPEC countries and for 
the other oil exporting countries. As regards the capability of OPEC to affect US 
production, the unexpected resilience of US tight oil production to the new low-price 
environment, thanks to the continuing improvements in extraction technologies, seems 
to provide a first negative assessment of the OPEC strategy. Figure 20 and Figure 21 
show how efficiency gains offset the reduced number of rigs, so that the production of 
crude oil and lease condensate in the US kept growing until the end of 2015, to flatten 
only in recent months. An interesting example of this trend is given by the evolution of 
LTO production in the Permian region (the most important one). As shown in Figure 20 
and Figure 21, while the number of rigs collapsed during 2015, the production per rig 
kept increasing, with a further acceleration at the beginning of 2016. The net result is 
that in the first quarter of 2016 total production has been higher than in the first quarter 
of each of the previous years (Figure 22 and Figure 23). 
A further important factor that contributed to the rapid reduction of oil prices since the 
second half of 2014 is the high oil price elasticity to changes in quantities demanded and 
offers on the market, either related to the weaker demand in emerging economies or the 
higher US production or the OPEC decision not to change its production target. Indeed, 
according to (Baumeister and Peersman, 2012) and (Smith, 2009) the oil market is 
characterized by a high price elasticity, which causes small changes in the expectations 
                                           
(4) Shale oil is light and sweet oil, but the US was the first country in the world for refining capacity of heavy 
and sour crudes, characterized from more complex and expensive processes of transformation. Although 
possible, distillation of LTO in existing US plants was therefore not very economical and efficient. This and 
the possibility of exporting oil products, unlike crude oil, had prevented the negative spread between WTI 
and Brent (reflecting the abundance of crude localized in central regions of the US and various challenges 
in making it flow down the Gulf of Mexico and to reach by ship other countries) to move to the refined 
products, which in the United States had remained attached to the prices prevailing in the rest of the 
world. Therefore, final consumers did not benefit of the lower crude prices. However, with the progressive 
removal of technical barriers and legal constraints to oil exports (new pipelines and progressive upgrading 
of crude oil transport networks), as well as improvements in capacity to refine light crude, especially in the 
central regions, the shale oil extracted in the United States can be now refined in a first rough way within 
the country, which allows to circumvent the ban on crude export (Cristadoro et al., 2015). 
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about demand and supply can result in rapid and extensive adjustments of the prices. 
According to (Baumeister and Peersman, 2012) a likely explanation of the systematic 
increase in the volatility of the real price of crude oil (observed in the years before 2010) 
is “that both the short-run price elasticities of oil demand and of oil supply have declined 
considerably since the second half of the 1980s. This implies that small disturbances on 
either side of the oil market can generate large price responses without large quantity 
movements, which helps explain the latest run-up and subsequent collapse in the price of 
oil”. However, this high price elasticity is one of the structural characteristics of the oil 
market that could be impacted by the shale revolution. 
Figure 20. Rig count. Permian region Figure 21. US Oil - Production per rig (Mcf) 
  
Source: own elaborations on EIA data (EIA, 2016f) 
 
Figure 22. US Oil production (Mcf) 
Figure 23. Production of crude oil and lease 
condensate in the US (thousand bbl/day) 
  
Source: own elaborations on EIA data (EIA, 2016f) 
  
20 
2.2 Features of current oil and gas markets 
The changes described above gave way to a debate on the possibility of a new economics 
of oil (and gas) markets (Dale, 2015), featured by ample supply of energy resources, 
interconnected and flexible oil and gas markets with less market power of traditional 
producers. The necessary condition for these new economics is that there have been 
some profound underlying changes in the balance of oil and gas supply and demand. In 
the following, section 2.2.1 discusses some new features of the oil market, section 2.2.2 
discusses some factors which can determine a different functioning of the natural gas 
market in the short to medium-term. Section 2.2.3 analyses in deep the role of UH. 
2.2.1 Oil 
As regards the oil market, the key question is how long the changes described above 
might last:  
 are we witnessing a primarily cyclical event, as usual in commodity markets? 
 or are there in place more deep-rooted structural changes in the way oil is 
produced and traded, so that the interactions between the different market 
players is also changing and with it the way market prices are determined? 
In the latter case, the important consequence is that these lower prices can persist. In 
order to assess how likely it is a return to the conditions prevailing in the oil market 
before the price fall started in 2014, it is useful to describe these conditions and assess if 
they could be realized again soon.  
2.2.1.1 The oil market before the price collapse 
During the long period of high oil prices started in the middle of 2010s, the growth of 
global oil demand outstripped the increase in the production capacity of the exporting 
countries. Oil consumption kept increasing in the emerging countries, exceeding the 
previous long-term trend. The opposite was true for the advanced economies, where in 
the middle of the decade oil consumption started decreasing (Figure 24). 
Figure 24. Oil consumption 1990-2015 in advanced and emerging economies (thousand bbl/day) 
 
Source: own elaborations on BP data (BP, 2016) 
Two more factors contributed to the bullish picture: on one hand, geopolitical tensions 
increased the fear of sudden interruptions of oil production in some key exporting regions 
(Iran, Iraq, Libya, Russia); on the other hand, geological as well as techno-economic 
factors constrained the potential response of oil supply to the growing demand: “Global 
field production of crude was flat between 2005 and 2008, despite the absence of a 
major identifiable geopolitical disruption, and despite the strong growth in demand from 
emerging countries. The run-up of oil prices over the last decade resulted from strong 
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growth of demand from emerging economies confronting limited physical potential to 
increase production from conventional sources” (Hamilton, 2014). These physical 
constraints were related to the difficulties to maintain oil production in the North Sea as 
well as the long-term decline of conventional production in the US “48 lower states”. The 
rise of production in Alaska (peak in 1988) as well as of off-shore production (peak in 
2003) did partially balance this decline only until the beginning of 2000s. In conclusion, 
the continuous rise of oil price between 2005 and 2014 can be explained by a rising 
demand (in 2014 oil demand was 7% higher than in 2007, before the start of the 
economic crisis) that could not be matched by a parallel growth in supply, due to a 
combination of constraints. The “shale revolution” was the key factor that made it 
possible to overcome these constraints (Cristadoro et al., 2015), together with the 
economic crisis and some structural factors in play in advanced economies 
(environmental policies and changes in consumers’ preferences), which reduced oil 
demand in OECD countries. Even though extraction costs are still well higher than the 
costs of conventional production, unconventional production has also proved to be 
sustainable even at prices below 50$/bbl. 
2.2.1.2 The oil market after the price fall: a few new structural characteristics 
The next step, in order to understand whether the oil and gas international markets are 
going through a cyclical phase or we are assisting to a structural change in the 
functioning of the markets, is to identify the current key characteristics of the market and 
to assess to what extent these characteristics include deep-rooted structural changes in 
the way oil is produced and traded. 
A first new fundamental characteristic of current oil markets is that there is no longer a 
strong reason to expect the relative price of oil to increase over time, because it is more 
and more unlikely that oil proven reserves need to be used (Dale, 2015). This comes 
from the combination of two factors:  
 on one hand, estimates of recoverable oil resources are still increasing, more 
quickly than existing reserves are consumed, and the shale revolution is a 
further step along this trend; 
 on the other hand, concerns about carbon emissions and climate change mean 
that “existing reserves of fossil fuels – i.e. oil, gas and coal – if used in their 
entirety would generate somewhere in excess of 2.8 trillion tonnes of CO2, well 
in excess of the 1 trillion tonnes or so the scientific community consider is 
consistent with limiting the rise in global mean temperatures to no more than 
2 degrees Centigrade” (Dale, 2015). 
The potential radical implication of this characteristic is that, as with other goods and 
services, the price of oil will depend on movements in demand and supply, without any 
underlying long-term trend towards an inevitable increase (the implicit consequence of 
assuming that the long-term evolution of oil price follows the so called Hotelling rule (5)).  
From the supply side, a key factor behind the long-term outlook of oil prices will be the 
evolution of future productivity. Clearly, it is still natural to assume that the relative price 
of oil will increase over time as it becomes increasingly difficult (and costly) to extract. 
But this increasing difficulty needs to be set against technological progress. The oil 
industry, as with any other successful industry, is continually innovating and 
implementing new techniques and processes. “The poster child for these advancements 
in recent years has been the US shale industry. The use of increasingly sophisticated 
drilling techniques and huge improvements in cost efficiencies has allowed previously 
uneconomic resources of oil to be recovered” (Dale, 2015). In recent years productivity 
gains within the US shale industry have been impressive: in terms of the initial 
                                           
(5) Harold Hotelling (1931) defined the classical economic theory of the long-term pricing of non-renewable 
resources like conventional oil. The theory states that the price of a depleting resource like conventional oil 
should rise over time at the interest rate because its value should increase as the stocks (reserves) are 
exhausted. 
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production per rig, productivity averaged over 30% per year between 2007 and 2014. In 
conclusion, there are several factors that have the potential to counterbalance the usual 
expectation that in the long-term oil price should rise. 
A second new fundamental characteristic of current oil markets comes directly from a 
further key feature of the US shale revolution: “the nature of fracking is far more akin to 
a standardised, repeated, manufacturing-like process, rather than the one-off, large-
scale engineering projects that characterise many conventional oil projects. The same 
rigs are used to drill multiple wells using the same processes in similar locations. And, as 
with many repeated manufacturing processes, fracking is generating strong productivity 
gains. The strength of manufacturing productivity has led to a trend decline in the prices 
of goods relative to services. A fascinating question raised by fracking – and its 
manufacturing-type characteristics – is whether it will have the same impact on the 
relative price of oil. A key issue here is whether these types of repeated, standardised 
processes can be applied outside of the US and to more conventional types of 
production” (Dale, 2015). 
A third fundamental characteristic of current oil markets is again strictly related to the 
intrinsic nature of unconventional resource extraction techniques. Traditionally, oil 
demand and supply curves are assumed to be steep, that is price inelastic: on one hand, 
there are relatively few substitutes for oil on the demand side, especially in the short 
run; on the other hand, oil production is very capital intensive, therefore once a new oil 
production facility is in place, its supply is not sensitive to price fluctuations. This limited 
responsiveness stems from the significant time lag between investment decisions and 
production from a conventional source. It can often take several years or more from the 
decision to invest in a particular field before it starts to produce oil, and once the oil is 
flowing, it will often last for many years. However, shale oil (and fracking) has completely 
different characteristics:  
 As the same rigs and the same processes are used to drill many wells in the 
same play, the time between a decision to drill a new well and oil being 
produced can be measured in weeks rather than years. For instance, in 2014 
the drilling phase in the Eagle Ford formation was completed on average in 
less than 9 days by EOG, in less than 13 days by Marathon Oil (Clò, 2015). 
 Moreover, the investment requested to start the development of shale plays is 
by far lower than the investment requested by traditional plays: the cost of 
drilling a rig is below 10 million dollars in the Bakken shale formation in North 
Dakota, the development of oil sands or deepwater oil requires several billions. 
 The life of a shale oil well tends to be far shorter than that for a conventional 
well: its decline rate is far steeper.  
Short production lags and high decline rates mean that there is a far closer 
correspondence between investment and production of shale oil. Investment decisions 
impacting production are far quicker (Figure 25), and production levels fall off far quicker 
unless investment is maintained. 
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Figure 25. Average lead times between final investment decision and first production for different 
types of oil resources 
 
Note: top 20 crude oil producers in 2014.  
Bubble size indicates the quantity of reserves developed from 2000 and 2014. 
Source: (IEA, 2015a) 
As a consequence, “the short-run responsiveness of shale oil to price changes will be far 
greater than that for conventional oil. As prices fall, investment and drilling activity will 
decline and production will soon follow. But as prices recover, investment and production 
can be increased relatively quickly. The US shale revolution has introduced a kink in the 
(short-run) oil supply curve, which should act to dampen price volatility (6). As prices fall, 
the supply of shale oil will decline, mitigating the fall in oil prices. Likewise, as prices 
recover, shale oil will increase, limiting any spike in oil prices. Shale oil acts as a form of 
shock absorber for the global oil market” (Dale, 2015). The key factor here is that there 
is now a significant amount of non-OPEC production which is thought to be elastic to 
market conditions. Indeed, US LTO is now seen as a critical balancing factor, with the 
potential to even become a new economic swing producer, as opposed to the traditional 
strategic swing producer, i.e. Saudi Arabia (Clò, 2015; Dale, 2015; IEA, 2015a). The 
consequence of a higher elasticity of oil supply is that the supply curve would be flatter 
and capacity constraints would become less important, that is less able to affect oil 
prices. 
A last issue that it is worth to discuss briefly is the current balance of power in the oil 
market, in particular the actual limited capability of OPEC to stabilise the market in front 
of persistent/structural shocks, like the US shale oil revolution. According to (Dale, 
2015), “the economically sensible response to such persistent shocks is for OPEC to 
maintain its market share and let other higher-cost producers, less able to compete, bear 
the brunt of the demand contraction.” This is because US shale, although cyclical, is 
likely to be a persistent source of supply for many years to come. Currently, much of 
shale oil production is situated somewhere in the middle of the cost curve, but thanks to 
the rapid pace of productivity improvements, this position relative to other types of 
production is increasing all the time. As a matter of fact, over 2014 OPEC did exactly 
what it had stated, that is it maintained its production target of 30 mb/d. In conclusion, 
OPEC is still a swing producer with respect to temporary/cyclical shocks, but “the greater 
                                           
(6) On the other hand, US shale has also “introduced a credit channel to the oil market. And it is well known 
from the misery of the financial crisis how destabilising credit and banking flows can be in transmitting and 
amplifying shocks. Until now, the financial resources of the national oil companies and the large 
supermajors mean that the oil market has been largely insulated from the vagaries of the banking system. 
But the small, heavily-indebted, independent producers that characterise the shale industry change all 
that.” (Dale 2015). 
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responsiveness of US shale means that cyclical movements in shale production should 
also help to stabilise the market”. 
2.2.2 Natural Gas 
Similarly to the oil market, a first key fundamental feature of the current natural gas 
market is that, due to the concerns about carbon emissions and climate change, natural 
gas demand is not expected anymore to increase in every scenario, as it was often 
assumed until recently. For instance, in the WEO 2015 (IEA, 2015a) natural gas is still 
the only fossil fuel to see an increase in the Scenario including current policies (the New 
Policies Scenario, where Climate policies are concentrated in Europe and the OECD 
countries). But the trajectory is completely different in the 450 Scenario (Figure 26), 
where climate policies are assumed to be implemented effectively and cooperatively, 
aiming at a global temperature increase of no more than 2°C. In the latter, gas 
consumption expands until the 2020s, then flattens out, as consequence of policies 
aimed at limiting energy-related carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
Figure 26. World natural gas demand in different scenarios in WEO 2015 
 
Source: (IEA, 2015a) 
Figure 27 presents estimates of the global resource potential (reserves + resources), 
divided into conventional and unconventional deposits, the RP/P ratio and the 
corresponding CO2 content of the resources. Apart from the big differences in the 
estimates of unconventional deposits among the various sources, due to the different 
accounting and extrapolation methods used in the studies, as well as intrinsic high 
uncertainty because exploration and large-scale production has just begun, the estimates 
suggest that at current production levels, the global resource potential would be 
sufficient for at least 200 years. 
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Figure 27. Global resource potentials (tcm), RP/P ratios and CO2 content (Gt) 
 
Notes: The RP/P is defined by the quotient of resource potential from the respective data source and the 
production level in 2013 from (BGR, 2014); CO2 content calculations are based on default emission factors 
given by the (IPCC, 2006). 
Source:(Richter, 2015)  
As already mentioned, a complete deployment of natural gas resources would conflict 
with ambitious climate targets. Indeed, the CO2 content of the natural gas resource 
potential (1,727 to 4,120 GtCO2) is higher than the estimated global carbon budget 
(about 1,000 Gt of future CO2 emissions) required to keep the global mean temperature 
increase below 2◦C (Richter, 2015). Physical restrictions on the supply will hence not 
solve the problem of climate change. Sufficient limitations on natural gas consumption 
will have to come from an artificial scarcity through political action mandating a global 
CO2 emissions cap or CO2 emissions taxes. In conclusion, similarly to what we saw for oil, 
there is now less reason to assume a long-term trend towards an inevitable increase of 
the natural gas price, as it is more and more unlikely that natural gas reserves need to 
be used: it is not possible to rely on a substantial (scarcity-driven) price increase in order 
to get a significant reduction of natural gas consumption.  
A second feature of the current international natural gas market is the prospect of 
oversupply and low prices in the medium term (IEA, 2015b). There is indeed a “growing 
acceptance that the current oversupply of gas is more than just a temporary 
phenomenon” (Timera Energy, 2015). This is for two reasons: on one hand, demand 
growth projections are weakening; on the other hand, large committed volumes of new 
supply are ramping up. As a consequence, “the world is getting used to a new phase of 
lower and more convergent global gas prices” (Timera Energy, 2015). 
Moreover, the forthcoming LNG export from North America plays a major role not only in 
supporting supply, but also in increasing the flexibility of supply, as export commitments 
made thus far for the US projects are entirely free of the destination clauses that have 
hampered the responsiveness of LNG trade to short-term changes in the global gas 
balance (IEA, 2015b). A striking example of this flexibility is given by the behaviour of US 
gas production in 2014, when gas prices at Henry Hub reached the highest level since 
2010, mainly driven by an extremely cold winter. The consequence was a remarkable 
production response, as cumulative annual production additions totalling 25 bcm over the 
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period. The magnitude of the supply-side response brought about by a small price 
increase (about 0.4$/MBtu) is further evidence of the surprisingly high supply-side 
elasticity of the US gas industry (IEA, 2015b). In conclusion, according to (IEA, 2015b) 
“the US gas market continues to show a tendency to tip into oversupply, with brief peaks 
of strength largely due to specific weather conditions”. 
A third fundamental feature of current natural gas markets which has been constantly 
evolving over the recent years is the way gas prices are set. Indeed, the substantial 
changes in international natural gas flows (see above) had an impact on the balance 
between buyers and sellers, which has shifted in favour of the former, and have been 
accompanied by changes in pricing mechanisms, particularly for the internationally 
traded gas.  
Europe is now witnessing an unprecedented collision between the two pricing 
mechanisms of oil indexation on one hand, of hub pricing and traded markets on the 
other hand, each one having different implications in terms of different gas industry 
cultures (Melling, 2010). In the last years, the period of high oil prices has already 
undermined for many buyers the model of oil-indexed gas prices. Now, the current 
period of low oil prices can contribute to change the perspective of the sellers as well, as 
they too, could start seeing the advantage of a decoupling between oil and gas prices. In 
any case, even if it is unlikely that oil indexation will disappear, it is becoming less 
important. Indeed, in recent years traditional oil indexed contracts have been replaced 
not only by imports of spot gas and increasing volumes traded at hubs, but also by new 
types of contracts including a proportion of hub/spot price indexation and in some cases 
a reduction in the take-or-pay levels. Moreover, some renegotiations have also seen the 
introduction of hybrid pricing formulas, where oil indexation is partly maintained, but 
within a price corridor set by hub prices. 
Box 2. The importance of price formation mechanisms for the future of natural gas in Europe 
Differently from the oil market, there is not a global gas market in the same sense. 
Instead, there are inter-related regional gas markets—defined first by geography, but 
also by economics and politics. “Historically, international trade in gas was quite limited, 
as gas was produced and consumed locally or regionally. Pricing mechanisms ranged 
from regulated prices set by governments, prices indexed to competing fuels, or spot 
market pricing in competitive markets” (see Annex 1 for a description of the different 
types of price formation mechanism). “Contracting structures in each of the major 
market areas evolved independently of the others and there was little reason for the 
pricing structures to be linked because gas was not a fungible international commodity 
like oil” (Melling, 2010). As a consequence, natural gas has now different regional 
benchmark prices.  
However, until recently the dominant mechanism for the international gas trade was oil 
indexation, which originated in Europe in the 1960s, as it was seen as a necessary 
condition for the development of the gas industry, then spread to Asia. The contrasting 
mechanism, based on hub pricing and traded markets, has developed in the United 
States, but in 1998 the UK gas network was linked to Belgium, causing commodity 
markets to spread into continental Europe. The consequence was a split of the European 
gas market, with oil indexation dominating the continent and competitive hub pricing 
developing into north-western Europe.  
With the fall in gas demand due to recession, the competition between the two pricing 
systems has intensified, because for the first time spot prices dropped well below oil-
indexed prices. Given the liberalized market, spot-priced gas (first of all LNG) started 
stealing market share from wholesalers supplied with oil-indexed gas, first of all pipeline 
gas from Russia and Algeria. “Wholesalers under contract to purchase gas from 
producers at oil-indexed prices had too much overpriced gas, and competitors with 
access to market-priced supplies cherry-picked their customers.  
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Box 2. The importance of price formation mechanisms for the future of natural gas in Europe 
(continued) 
While major utilities faced billions of dollars in penalties for failure to take agreed amounts of gas, 
producers’ revenues fell sharply below expectations. Suddenly, gas exporters were pressured to 
reduce the oil-indexed prices in their long-term contracts with European wholesalers. This dramatic 
collision of two industry cultures with competing pricing structures has persisted” (Melling, 2010). 
In conclusion, “[…] one of the most essential questions related to global energy supplies and 
security is whether the traditional link between oil and gas prices will survive. And the implications 
stretch beyond Europe’s borders because once-isolated regional gas markets are now 
interconnected through the rising trade in liquefied natural gas” (Melling, 2010). 
 
According to the last IGU Wholesale Gas Price Survey International Gas Union (Figure 
28), gas on gas (GOG) competition has already the largest share in the world gas 
market, with a share of 43% of total gas consumption (around 1,500 bcm), dominated 
by North America followed by Europe, while the share of oil price escalation or oil 
indexation stands at some 17% (around 610 bcm) and is predominantly Asia Pacific and 
Europe.  
Figure 28. Total Consumption (bcm, %) 
 
Source: (International Gas Union, 2015) 
The picture becomes different when considering only the gas that is traded (Figure 29). 
Total imports in 2014 accounted for some 26% of total world consumption (around 966 
bcm). The share of OPEC raises to 51%, while gas on gas competition stands at 42% and 
Bilateral Monopoly at 7%. 
Figure 29.– Total Imports 2014 (bcm) 
 
Source: own elaboration on (International Gas Union, 2015) 
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However, in the 2005 to 2014 period there has been a continuous move away from oil 
price escalation to gas on gas competition (Figure 30). In Europe the latter’s share 
increased from 15% in 2005 – when oil price escalation was 78% – to 61% in 2014 – 
when oil price escalation had declined to 32%. The change in price formation 
mechanisms in Europe has been impressive, even though it was not homogeneous across 
the region (see Box 2). While Northwest Europe saw a complete reversal, from 72% oil 
price escalation to the current 88% of gas on gas competition, gas on gas competition 
has increased in Central Europe from almost zero in 2005 to over 50%, the change has 
been much lower in other areas of Europe such as the Mediterranean, where OPE 
declined from 100% in 2005 to around 64% in 2014 and GOG increased to around 30%. 
This initially reflected spot LNG imports in the sub-region and some spot pipeline imports 
into Italy, as well as changes in the pricing of domestic production in Italy and 
renegotiations of the main Russian contracts. 
Figure 30. World Price Formation – Total Imports 2005-2015 (bcm) 
 
Source: own elaboration on (International Gas Union, 2016) 
Most likely in the future gas market different ways of pricing gas will co-exist (often even 
in the same pricing formula), as companies look for a balanced way to manage risks. 
There will also be regional differences, with gas export from the United States priced off 
domestic wholesale prices, while established exporters are likely to move only slowly 
away from their current systems. However, in this new market environment it is likely 
that new suppliers in particular will look for “new hybrid ways to guarantee income 
streams for their long term, very capital-intensive projects, while still meeting their 
buyers’ needs and expectations, and more flexibility to respond to changing market 
circumstances” (IEA, 2015a).  
Inflexible supply (i.e. mainly pipeline contract take or pay volumes and destination 
inflexible LNG contracts) would flow regardless of the absolute hub price level (although 
several tranches are profiled within year and have an influence on seasonal price 
spreads), which moves based on the changing intersection between demand and supply. 
To be more specific, the main drivers of hub pricing dynamics are the volumes of flexible 
supply that are responsive to price (i.e. pipeline contract swing volumes, uncontracted 
pipeline import flexibility, spot and divertible LNG, gas storage). Indeed, as demand is 
relatively insensitive to price, it is supply flexibility that plays the central role in 
determining how prices evolve at the margin (Timera Energy, 2015). In conclusion, the 
increase of flexible supplies in the new market environment looks like a change of market 
fundamentals with potentially structural effects. 
2005 2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015
BIM 127.8 117.3 45.2 52.5 59 59.5 60.7 63.2
GOG 165.4 235.8 236 297.8 352.6 371.1 381.1 432.2
OPE 506.4 504.2 540.8 587.6 553.2 547.8 488.9 470.6
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2.2.3 The role of unconventional resources 
In the previous two paragraphs (sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) we have discussed the 
possibility that oil and gas markets would undergo important changes in their structural 
characteristics, that is deep-rooted structural changes in the way oil and gas are 
produced and traded. The significant role of unconventional oil and gas in contributing to 
these changes can be summarized as follows. 
In the oil market: 
 The “shale revolution” was a key factor that made possible to overcome the 
constraints that explained the continuous rise of oil price between 2005 and 2014. 
 The remarkable innovations and productivity gains in the shale industry are a 
recent new factor supporting the thesis that there is no longer a strong reason to 
expect the relative price of oil to increase over time, because the increasing 
difficulty and costs of extraction needs to be set against technological progress. 
 The manufacturing-type characteristics of fracking raise the question whether it 
can lead to a progressive reduction of the relative price of oil. 
 Last, probably the most important argument which is strictly related to the 
intrinsic nature of unconventional resource extraction techniques is related to the 
short production lags and high decline rates of unconventional oil extraction. As 
investment decisions can affect production far more quickly than in the past, there 
would be now for the first time a significant amount of non-OPEC production 
which is thought to be elastic to market conditions. 
In the natural gas market, similarly to what seen for the oil market, the “shale gas 
revolution” can play a major role not only in supporting supply, but also in increasing the 
flexibility of global gas supply, thanks to its impact on the relative importance of the 
different price formation mechanisms:  
 In recent years the “shale gas revolution” has already had an impact on the 
relative importance of Gas-on-Gas competition (GOG) in the global gas market: 
the prolonged situation of excess supply, strongly influenced by the impressive 
increase of gas production in the USA, lead to spot prices constantly lower than 
long-term take-or-pay contracts, thus to a further increase of the percentage of 
GOG: in 2015 it was 45% of on total global imports, from 32% in 2010.  
 In the medium term, the forthcoming LNG export from North America is expected 
to be free of the destination clauses that have hampered the responsiveness of 
LNG trade to short-term changes in the global gas balance.  
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3 Critical variables for a structural change of oil and gas 
markets 
The previous chapter discussed some potentially structural changes in the oil and gas 
market, highlighting the role of UH already had in these changes. Now, in order to 
explore the conditions under which these changes can characterize the functioning of oil 
and gas markets in the future and to assess how UH can affect this trend, it is worth it to 
explore the following questions:  
 what are the conditions under which some characteristics of the current 
energy market equilibrium can consolidate, thus consolidating the economic 
consequences described in the previous sections? 
 does the further development of UH have the potential to consolidate these 
changes, to the point that this new economics can become the new stylized 
facts of global energy markets? 
The answers to these questions are of high importance, for both the future of oil and gas 
markets and for a further issue which is strictly related: there could be a potential risk for 
this unexpected evolution of energy markets to be at odds with the objective to 
decarbonize the global energy system, or that it could make it more difficult the 
implementation of climate change mitigation policies. 
In the following we draw from the literature on medium/long-term energy scenarios a set 
of variables and uncertainties which are expected to have a decisive influence on the 
possibility of a future evolution of global energy markets along the lines described above. 
These variable and uncertainties will be explored in the model based scenario analysis 
described through the “scenario tree” depicted in Figure 31 below.  
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Figure 31. Scenario tree for the scenario analysis 7 
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3.1 Stringency of climate policies 
The first key uncertainty (first step of the scenario tree, Figure 31) relates to the 
possibility of a global agreement on CO2 and the implementation of stringent climate 
policies. As seen in section 2.2.2, this would lead to a trajectory of gas consumption 
which is substantially different from the one expected with less stringent climate policies 
(Figure 26). The same is true for oil. For instance, in the IEA WEO 450 scenario (IEA, 
2015a), oil consumption decrease to less than 80 Mbbl/day by 2040. 
3.2 Economics of unconventional oil and gas 
The second key uncertainty that must be addressed is the wide range of projections 
about the actual development of unconventional oil and gas (step 2 and 3 of the scenario 
tree, Figure 31), both in the US and around the world, and on the key factors underlying 
the different projections. 
3.2.1 Unconventional oil 
Rising US LTO supply has often been described as a “game changer”, not only for its 
production volumes but even more for its responsiveness to lower prices. Its short lead 
and pay-back times, rapid well-level decline rates and treadmill-like investment 
requirements make it far more price elastic than conventional crude. Price declines have 
already caused the US LTO rig count to drop abruptly, setting the stage for a significantly 
faster supply response than would be typically expected from conventional crude 
producers. Now, a key issue is the future balance between the possible increase in the 
extraction cost, due to the progressive depletion of resources, and the cost decrease due 
to efficiency gains. This balance can be also substantially affected by the possibility that 
the amount of resources proves to be larger than expected, because in that case the 
depletion effect would be lower. Moreover, the estimate of resources seems to have a 
particular influence on the potential continuation of LTO US production (IEA, 2015a). In 
case of favourable assumptions on resources and costs, it is much more likely the 
continuation of LTO production in the US and its role as game changer in the global oil 
market, as it increases the elasticity of oil supply. This can be further reinforced by LTO 
production in Canada, Russia, Argentina and Mexico, the countries with the highest 
potential (Figure 32). 
Figure 32. LTO production by country in the IEA WEO 2014 New Policy scenario 
 
Source: (IEA, 2014b) 
Besides the economics of unconventional oil, a wide energy system perspective implies 
the need to consider a further set of factors. As seen in section 2 above, the "shale 
revolution" in the US has already determined a shift in the geopolitics of oil and made it 
convenient for OPEC to abandon the strategy to keep reducing its share in global supply 
in order to secure higher prices on sales. On the contrary, OPEC decided to let the 
courses remain at moderate levels, to try to curb the expansion of US production, which 
is characterized by higher mining costs. Anyway, this strategy could still lead to a 
prolonged period of low crude oil prices provided that, in the short term, the US supply 
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effects on a fall in prices are limited. The condition for this to happen is that US oil is 
produced at lower costs than the marginal price, and indeed US marginal costs are still 
decreasing at high rates (see section 2 background analysis), due to the advancement of 
mining techniques. For this reason, the decision not to reduce supply, which is probably 
sustainable in the medium-term for Saudi Arabia, cannot be sustainable for all the OPEC 
members, as some of them (Venezuela, Iran) have higher extraction costs and more 
stringent financing requirements. It is also questionable that this strategy could be 
sustainable for Russia, which already faces considerable difficulties for international 
reactions to the situation in Ukraine. The net result of a scenario assuming that OPEC 
holds firmly its decision to maintain its market share and Saudi Arabia gives up the role 
of marginal producer is that in the medium term the equilibrium price could be 
determined by the marginal cost of production in producing countries outside the cartel. 
This leads to the issues discusses in section 4.1: if the US shale oil revolution is 
persistent/structural shock, OPEC could be simply unable to stabilize the market. 
3.2.2 Unconventional gas 
The main areas of uncertainty around unconventional gas is related to the size of 
unproven Technically Recoverable Resources (TRR), the estimated ultimate recovery 
(EUR) rates from shale wells, the economics of shale gas and tight oil recovery. The 
latter is linked to the possibility that the low price resulting from the recent gas glut 
would not be sufficient to sustain investment in the medium to long term, especially as 
the low hanging fruit of the unconventional resources is gradually picked (Spencer et al., 
2014) .  
A key issue that could have a strong impact on the development of unconventional gas is 
the extent to which the combination of factors that made possible the development of 
shale gas in US could be replicated elsewhere. Few regions deserve particular attention, 
due to their high potential: China, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, Algeria (Figure 33). China, 
the country with the highest TRR, is the most important among these regions: the two 
extreme cases of a low shale scenario and a high shale scenario can have very different 
implications on the evolution of global gas markets, as trade flows could be different by 
as much as some hundreds bcm. The final outlook for unconventional gas in China 
depends upon the answer to some broader questions about the development of China’s 
gas sector, including regulatory aspects, the possibility of specific subsidies to support 
unconventional gas. On the contrary, it seems that the uncertainty around European 
resources deserves less attention, as in any case the main impact on EU market will 
depend much more on global shale gas development. 
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Figure 33. Technically recoverable shale gas resources and current development status 8 
 
Notes: In green: countries where production and commercialization activities have already started; in yelow: 
countries where some initial exploration activities are ongoing and the governments have showed some 
egament in resource development plan; in red: countries where no development activities have been registered 
or they have stopped. 
Source: own elaboration on on (Proietti Silvestri and Gugliotta, 2015) 
With respect to extraction costs, the key issue is to what extent the low-price 
environment will affect the shale gas industry (in the sense of reduction of the 
profitability of new investments), first of all in the US. As seen above, so far the effect 
has been much lower than expected, thanks to the ability of the US industry to absorb 
shocks through continuous improvements in extraction technologies. 
3.3 Development of an integrated global gas market 
The fourth variable of the scenario tree depicted in Figure 31 relates to the uncertainty 
about the potential development of an integrated global gas market (9). In this respect 
the main drives are represented by a substantial decrease of LNG costs and the actual 
full development of new infrastructures planed worldwide, which is also instrumental to 
the worldwide development of unconventional gas. 
Indeed, a lesson of the recent evolution of energy markets is that the main impact of US 
unconventional resources on other energy systems has been through its indirect effects 
on global energy markets. Even some of the most important effects of low oil price are 
indirect, through the reduction of oil-indexed gas prices, due to the fact that in many 
demand sectors oil does not compete with other fuels. As seen above, this brought about 
a substantial impact on the way internationally traded natural gas is priced, with a 
progressive decrease of oil-indexation and a parallel increase of gas to gas competition. 
At the moment a critical issue is that by 2020 US LNG export capacity is still projected to 
increase sharply, to at least 50 bcm. However, at current LNG costs “most of the further 
LNG projects worldwide will have problems to be realized, while a strong reduction in 
liquefaction and transportation costs (including the development of Floating LNG) could 
be a decisive step towards an integrated global gas market. US LNG projects with Henry 
Hub indexed pricing attracted many Asian customers between 2012 and mid-2014 when 
                                           
(8) Colour legend: Green: commercially available, Yellow: exploring activities and governments commitment, 
Red: no development. 
(9) An integrated global gas market (or a fully global gas market) can be defined as a market where the 
differences in the price of gas across regions of the world are due, essentially, to transport costs. A global 
gas market is, in this sense, more efficient compared to the case of multiple international markets for the 
same commodity. 
35 
the average differential between a traditional oil-linked LNG contract and a US Henry Hub 
-linked one was about 6$/MBtu on a delivered basis to Asia. With the steep fall in oil 
prices, that price gap has evaporated” (IEA, 2015a). In short, at current gas and oil 
prices, the economic advantage of US LNG for an Asian buyer disappears.  
The cost estimates for new projects of LNG liquefaction capacity goes from a minimum of 
600 $/tonne for the extension of existing projects or conversion of previous LNG import 
terminals in the US - which can rely extensively on the use of existing infrastructure - to 
a maximum of 3000 $/tonne for greenfield projects with various levels of complexity, 
including floating LNG projects. 
An important potential consequence of an integrated global gas market is characterized 
by excess of LNG capacity and lower LNG costs, which make LNG trade competitive even 
over long-distances. Such perspective can lead to a substantial and structural fall of gas 
prices, and a (potentially structural) disconnection from oil-indexed contracts (Timera 
Energy, 2015). This is because at the moment, the European hubs, as a market of last 
resort, are providing a global price support to surplus LNG flows. The ability of European 
hubs to absorb LNG is driven primarily by the supplier's flexibility to ramp down pipeline 
contract volume to take-or-pay levels. But there could be a tipping point where contract 
swing flexibility is exhausted and “hub prices may disconnect from oil-indexed contract 
prices and fall substantially, firstly to levels that induce gas vs. coal switching in 
European power markets and then ultimately towards price support from Henry Hub” 
(Timera Energy, 2015). In conclusion, it is worth to explore a scenario of LNG oversupply 
in the short to medium term, plus low LNG costs in the medium to long term, as it can 
lead to lower natural gas production as well as gas prices structurally disconnected from 
oil prices.  
3.4 The demand side 
The last critical variable included in the scenario analysis (step 5 of the scenario tree, 
Figure 31) is the uncertainty about the demand side of both the oil and gas market. 
With respect to the oil market A long lasting shift in OPEC strategy that prioritizes the 
preservation of  oil’s share in the economy as well as OPEC’s share in the oil market 
makes a long period of low oil price unlikely and not sustainable in the long-term, (IEA, 
2015a). In that case, it must be taken into account the potential rebound in oil demand 
that would be mainly fulfilled by increased OPEC production, progressively leading to a 
rise in oil price. This leads to the question of how demand for oil in high demand 
countries might pick up in response to lower prices. But again, the picture could be very 
different in case of a technology breakthrough which induces a significant and structural 
displacement of oil demand (e.g. through the development of alternative fuels and 
technologies in transportation) or a structural shift in oil supply (e.g. through an 
innovation that increases recovery rates).  
About the natural gas market, LNG projects worldwide can suffer from a combination of 
reduced economic attractiveness and weaker than expected demand, particularly in Asia. 
There are reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic about future natural gas demand. 
"Optimistic" forecasts come from the relative abundance of natural gas resources; its 
lower carbon content with respect to other fossil fuels; its flexibility and adaptability that 
make it a valuable component of a gradually decarbonising electricity and energy system. 
On the other hand, due to its versatility natural gas faces strong competition in all 
segments of the market where it is used. It is also much more expensive to transport 
than other fossil fuels, which makes it less competitive in markets which are dependent 
on long-distance imports. Moreover, even the potential environmental advantages of gas 
compared to other more carbon intensive fossil fuels are under scrutiny, mainly due to 
the damaging impact of methane emissions, a powerful greenhouse gas, and because of 
the impacts on water resources associated with unconventional gas development. Finally 
the unconventional gas resources development is challenged by problems of public 
acceptance in a number of countries.  
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As seen above, the current natural gas market is in a new phase of lower and more 
convergent global gas prices, determined by a situation of oversupply which is expected 
to stay for some years at least and that could be absorbed via a price-driven response on 
the demand side. The expectations about this demand response are now more and more 
uncertain, given what said above about the potential implications of climate change 
policies, together with the high uncertainty on the price responsiveness of future gas 
demand in emerging countries. 
In recent years, in a world of very cheap coal and plummeting renewables costs, it was 
difficult for gas to compete. Gas demand growth has increased well below its ten-year 
average. In OECD countries, gas demand from the power sector remains challenged by a 
low electricity demand growth amid to continued robust deployment of subsidised 
renewables. With respect to the future of gas in Europe, according to some estimations 
with coal prices at rock bottom and carbon prices still relatively low, imported gas would 
have to be available at around 5 $/MBtu to see a significant swing back to gas in the 
European power sector (Timera Energy, 2015). 
A critical issue is the recent weakness of energy demand in Asia, the region with by far 
the stronger economic grow rate over the last decade. The price responsiveness of gas 
demand in this region will be of critical importance. For instance, profound changes are 
unfolding in China in relation to both the structure of the economy and the way energy is 
deployed. However, the net effect of these transformations is less clear for gas than it is 
for other energy commodities (IEA, 2015a). On one hand the recent slower growth in 
primary energy consumption and the rapid deployment of renewables together with the 
ongoing intensification of China’s environmental policy should be broadly beneficial for 
gas. While natural gas remains uncompetitive when compared with coal, the price spread 
between the two has narrowed appreciably and this has the potential to increase the 
attractiveness of natural gas due to its potential environmental benefits compared to 
other more carbon intensive fossil fuels (IEA, 2015b). 
An important source of uncertainty is the potential growth of natural gas consumption in 
the transportation sector, in the form of compressed natural gas (mainly for passenger 
vehicles) and LNG (for trucks and maritime transport). Indeed, in a High Impact-Low 
Probability scenario (Figure 31) natural gas vehicles (compressed natural gas CNG and 
LNG) alone can displace up to 7 Mbbl/day of oil by 2035 (IEA, 2012). Such scenario 
would be more likely in case of large oil and gas price differentials and of public policies 
that promote infrastructure development or natural gas vehicles substitution with less 
polluting vehicles, for instance as a response to concerns about oil security or urban air 
quality. 
The evolution of gas demand is important also because it will be a key determinant of 
whether hubs reach the tipping point discussed in the previous paragraph. If European 
medium term demand is low, this reduces the scope for European hubs to absorb LNG 
imports while meeting Russian take-or-pay volumes. This outcome would be even more 
likely in the case of weak Asian LNG demand: “if a significant volume of that increase in 
LNG supply flows into Europe, it will test the ability of European hubs to ramp down 
swing contract take in order to absorb increasing LNG inflows. Under these conditions, 
the switching of coal for gas plant in the power sector will become a key driver of 
marginal hub pricing dynamics" (Timera Energy, 2015). 
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4 The potential impacts of unconventional hydrocarbons in 
future energy markets 
Ultimate objective of this section is to quantitatively explore the potential development of 
unconventional resources at global scale, and its possible impacts on energy markets 
through a scenario analysis.  
The key objectives of this modelling analysis are: 
 Exploring the role of unconventional resources on future gas and oil energy 
markets. 
 Identifying the critical variables which can affect the economic performance of the 
UH industry. 
 Assessing the implications of unconventional resources in European energy 
market. 
In particular, it investigates the way in which a set of key variables (starting from a 
range of alternative assumptions on resource size, production cost and infrastructure) 
interact with the global energy market, impacting on factors like the regional distribution 
of gas and oil production, interregional trade, demand and prices. The results assess how 
the global potential for unconventional gas and oil development is contingent on some 
key variables that change widely across regionally distinct energy systems. The section is 
structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents the methodology which underpins the 
analysis, section 4.2 provides details related to the focus and the specific scenario 
implementation. Section 4.3 shows modelling results and discuss key findings. 
4.1 Methodology 
The analysis is carried out by means of the global energy system model JRC Energy 
Trade Model (JRC ETM), that hard-links two multi-regional models: the global TIMES 
Integrated Assessment Model (ETSAP-TIAM) and the JRC-EU-TIMES (JET) model, a 
European energy system model. The linked model (JRC ETM) was developed by the DG 
JRC global gas market Energy, Transport and Climate of the EC and was made available 
to E4SMA S.r.l. for the sole purposes of this analysis.  
In this configuration, the JRC ETM is a partial equilibrium model with a global 
geographical scope of the energy system. It explicitly represents 44 separate regions: 13 
ETSAP-TIAM regions - namely Africa (AFR), Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Central-
South America (CSA), Former Soviet Union (FSU), Middle East (MEA), Mexico (MEX), 
Other Developing Asia (ODA), United States (USA) - and  31 European countries, namely 
the EU-28 Member States (MS) plus Switzerland (CH), Iceland (IC) and Norway (NO)1011 
in the linked model. Moreover the JRC ETM allows the import flows to EU to be 
endogenously determined by the model, while they were determined exogenously in the 
ETSAP-TIAM standalone version. . In this configuration, all the 44 regions of the JRC ETM 
compete for the same supply resources. The model is solved by minimizing the total cost 
of the global system, while satisfying the exogenous demands for energy services, and 
complying with the extraction constraints and the capacities of trade. The model 
endogenously calculates the implications for the energy systems in terms of prices, flows, 
capacities, emissions, and others for each EU country and each world region.  
Detailed information about the two hard-linked models is available in (Gracceva and 
Zeniewski, 2015, 2014, 2013, IEA-ETSAP, n.d., n.d.; Loulou and Labriet, 2008), and 
from (Sgobbi et al., 2016, 2015, Simoes et al., 2017, 2013; Thiel et al., 2016). 
                                           
(10) The complete list of JRC ETM and ETSAP-TIAM regions and acronyms can be found in the list of 
abbreviation. 
(11) The original European regions of the ETSAP-TIAM (Western Europe (WEU) and Eastern Europe (EEU)) are 
replaced with 31 European regions in the JRC ETM, increasing the level of detail of the modelling effort.  
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Box 3. The TIMES modelling framework 
The JRC Energy Trade Model (JRC ETM) has been developed in TIMES (The Integrated 
Markal-Efom System), which is a bottom-up energy systems modelling framework 
developed and supported by the IEA Energy Technology Systems Analysis Program (IEA-
ETSAP). The IEA-ETSAP community leads a major initiative for open source solutions for 
energy scenario modelling needs. It operates as a consortium of member country teams 
– including the EC – and invited teams that actively cooperate to establish, maintain, and 
expand a consistent multi-country energy/economy/environment/engineering (4E) 
analytical capability. Its backbone consists of individual national teams in nearly 70 
countries, and a common, comparable and combinable methodology, mainly based on 
the MARKAL/TIMES family of models, permitting the compilation of long term energy 
scenarios and in-depth national, multi-country, and global energy and environmental 
analyses (IEA-ETSAP, n.d.). 
TIMES combines both technical engineering and economic approaches (Gargiulo and Ó 
Gallachóir, 2013). It approaches energy as a system rather than as a set of elements. 
This has the advantage of providing insights into the most important substitution options 
that are linked to the system as a whole and that cannot be understood when analysing a 
single technology, or commodity, or sector (Chiodi et al., 2015).  
TIMES generates future energy system pathways that meet energy service demands at 
least-cost approach and subject to environmental and technical constraints, such as 
mitigation targets. The energy system costs include investment, operation and 
maintenance costs, plus the costs of imported fuels, minus the incomes of exported fuels, 
and the residual value of technologies at the end of the horizon (Loulou et al., 2005). 
A number of studies involving TIMES and its predecessor MARKAL are summarised in the 
ETSAP Annex X and XI reports (IEA-ETSAP, 2011, 2008), and in (Giannakidis et al., 
2015). 
4.2 Focus 
The aim of this analysis is to explore the role of UH to 2040, given the latest oil and gas 
market dynamics and technology development. For this purpose, the JRC ETM has been 
setup and updated to explore the key techno-economic dynamics. This section provides 
an overview of key modelling changes, assumptions and the approach used to define the 
modelling scenarios. 
4.2.1 Model setup 
The JRC ETM used in this analysis has been developed to deliver simulations with a time 
horizon of 35 years that ranges from 2005, the base year, to 2040. At it is explained in 
Box 1, this version of the  model has been modified and updated for the purpose of this 
analysis and to provide a follow up to the previous study dated 2012 (Pearson et al., 
2012) . The main improvements provided by the current study are related to elements 
that directly and indirectly relate to conventional and UH modelling assumptions that are 
relevant for this study, in particular on: 
 Climate policies; 
 Oil and gas reserves and resources assessments; 
 Oil and gas extraction costs; 
 International gas trades; 
 LNG infrastructures. 
This review has been based on most recent public available sources and on datasets and 
publications made available by the DG JRC Directorate C for this project. Alternative 
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assumptions and projections of key drivers have been assessed and when possible, 
compared. Annex 1 provides the list of key sources which have been included in our data 
collection and a brief description of the spreadsheet database developed for this purpose. 
4.2.1.1 Climate policies 
Climate policies are the first critical variables for the potential development of UH in the 
energy markets. Two alternative global emissions pathways – Representative 
Concentration Pathway (RCP) – have been identified as relevant for this analysis, i.e. i) 
the RCP 4.5, and ii) the RCP 2.6, which assume different levels of radiative forcing. The 
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2013) has been used as main reference for 
designing these emissions trajectories, as shown in Figure 34. The RCP 4.5 scenario 
assumes that emissions will peak around 2040 and then will start to reduce by the end of 
the century; while the RCP 2.6 assumes a faster decline of emissions peaking in 2020 
and becoming negative beyond 2080. It is worth noting that, as this analysis has a 
horizon to 2040, the RCP 4.5 pathway can be also assumed equivalent to the RCP 6.0 
scenario, as trajectories in the medium term (till 2040) are very close. 
Figure 34. CO2 emissions trajectories 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on IPCC (IPCC, 2013) 
Table 2 summarizes the numerical values of these trajectories. These scenario variables 
have been implemented in the model both as cumulative targets, which are aligned with 
the long-term policy but which may deliver slightly different emissions trajectories to 
IPCC; and milestone targets, which exactly reproduce IPCC trajectories. The scenarios 
presented in this report use the latter. 
Table 2. Global CO2 emissions (Mt CO2/yr) and global surface temperature change range (°C) 
relative to reference period 1986–2005 
 
Scenario 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Emissions 
RCP2.6 31,551 32,980 26,421 17,553 11,763 
RCP4.5 31,294 35,875 39,686 41,225 39,979 
Temperature 
RCP2.6 0.19‒0.62 0.36‒1.07 0.47‒1.24 0.51‒1.50 0.49‒1.65 
RCP4.5 0.22‒0.59 0.39‒0.83 0.56‒1.22 0.64‒1.57 0.84‒1.97 
Source: (IPCC, 2013) 
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4.2.1.2 Oil and gas reserves and resources assessments 
The characterization of oil and gas resources and reserves, both conventional and 
unconventional, are the key element for this analysis. In the scientific literature a large 
number of sources provide estimates about global potentials of both conventional and 
unconventional oil and gas. In this analysis we decided to use the assessments 
performed by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) 
(BGR, 2014). This source was selected for the following key reasons:  
 This assessment is one of the most recently available, i.e. published in 2014. 
 It is based on its self-consistent geological analysis, not referring to other sources. 
 Its geographical coverage: it covers all the JRC ETM regions. 
 Its detailed information: it provides the split between different types of gas and 
oil. 
Table 3 summarizes the oil and gas potentials assumed in this study for the ETSAP-TIAM 
regions. Conventional Gas and Oil reserve/resources estimates have been implemented 
as it is in the model, while, given the high uncertainty around UH projects, two sets of 
alternative assumptions have been created for unconventional sources potential: the first 
set of assumptions represents a ‘high growth’ outlook, which assumes that all the 
geologically available resources may be available for extraction. The second one 
represents a ‘low growth’ outlook that assumes that the development of UH resources 
might be available only to selected countries, i.e. where an unconventional hydrocarbon 
industry is already in place or projects are in an advanced stage of development.  
Assumptions on unconventional gas resources are drawn upon the analysis of (Silvestri 
et al., 2015); while assumptions for other unconventional gas resources (coal bed 
methane and tight gas) and unconventional oil are based on current development levels 
(12).  
For the EU detailed estimates by MS of unconventional resources are also provided. 
These are based on best-available information, in particular: 
 Shale Gas and Oil: as defined in the JRC-EU-TIMES model(13); 
 Coal-Bed Methane: as assessed by (Schultz and Adler, 2016); 
 Tight Gas, Extra-Heavy Oil and Oil sand: as in (BGR, 2014); 
Historical gas and oil production levels have been also updated for the period 2005-2013. 
These are based on IEA (IEA, 2015c, 2015d) for year 2005 and (BGR, 2014) for year 
2013.  
                                           
(12) Coal bed methane and tight oil limited to US; tight gas limited to US, Canada and Former Soviet Union; oil 
sands limited to Canada; extra-heavy oil limited to US and Central-South America. 
(13) The version of the JRC-EU TIMES model used in this analysis is the nr. 20/2015 
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4.2.1.3 Oil and gas extraction costs 
In this study extraction costs for both oil and gas have been completely revised and 
updated compared to the analysis of 2012. Conventional gas and oil costs are now based 
on own elaborations drawn from (McGlade, 2013). Shale gas and oil extraction costs are 
our own estimates, based on findings and guidance from Advanced Resources 
International (ARI) (Godec and Spisto, 2016). Coal-Bed Methane extraction costs are 
based on a set of cost prospects provided by DG JRC for some selected EU countries 
(Schultz and Adler, 2016). Oil sands and extra-heavy oil extraction cost are based on 
IIASA estimates (Rogner et al., 2012). Extrapolation of costs between the different 
regions are based on regional cost factors from (DoD, 2016).  
Table 4 and Table 5 provide a summary of the assumed conventional and unconventional 
gas and oil extraction costs for 2015. As in the case of resource potentials, given the high 
level of uncertainty around unconventional cost estimates, two sets of alternative 
assumptions have been created. The first one provides a cost outlook, which assumes 
that extraction costs for shale gas and oil will decrease across the time horizon according 
to assumptions used in previous analysis (Pearson et al., 2012). The second outlook 
assumes that extraction costs for all UH resources will remain at the level of the current 
estimates. In the next sections of this report we refer respectively to ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
technology learning profiles to refer to these two alternative cost outlooks.  
It is worth noting that both learning curves and regional cost factors may influence 
greatly the deployment of unconventional resources. The input files have been designed 
to easily provide the possibility of performing sensitivity analysis around these key 
elements. This is not included in this report, but might be assessed in further work. 
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4.2.1.4 International gas trades 
Gas trade routes (both via pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)) are another key 
element for a full development of a global gas market. These have been completely 
reviewed for this analysis compared to previous work (Pearson et al., 2012). The 
combination of possible trade trajectories between different global regions (i.e. ETSAP-
TIAM regions) and European countries (i.e. JET regions) has been expanded. Also with 
respect to international gas trade two distinct scenario assumptions have been 
developed: 
 ‘Low growth’ outlook: where the only pipeline gas trade options are the routes 
existing in 2015 plus additional trade capacity expansions between already 
interconnected couples of countries. 
 ‘High growth’ outlook: this scenario assumes that, in addition to the pipelines 
defined in the low-growth approach, new pipeline routes between couples of 
countries not previously interconnected will be implemented. 
Both of these scenarios use the latest ENTSO-G Ten Year Network Development Plan 
(TYNDP) as key source of information (EntsoG, 2016). The LNG available trade routes are 
assumed to be the same in both scenarios (14).  
4.2.1.5 LNG infrastructures 
This section refers to the infrastructure that allows for the trade of gas internationally, 
namely liquefaction and regasification plants. The assessment of the current state of the 
art and future development have been performed making use of two IHS databases (IHS, 
2016, 2015), made available for the sole purposes of this service by the DG JRC 
Directorate C Energy, Transport and Climate. The database provides a complete overview 
of liquefaction and regasification projects, including production capacities, development 
status, start year, etc.  
To deal with market uncertainty two distinct scenario assumptions have been developed, 
i.e. a ‘low-growth’ and a ‘high-growth’ outlook: 
 ‘Low-growth’ outlook: the only liquefaction/regasification facilities available to 
the market are the ones already built or under construction in 2016. No further 
investments are foreseen.  
 ‘High-growth’ outlook: this scenario assumes that in addition to the capacities 
defined in the low-growth approach, the JRC ETM will have the flexibility to 
(endogenously) decide to allocate additional capacities across the model regions. 
The new capacity will be limited to the projects that are currently in the ‘under 
development’, ‘proposed’ or ‘FEED’ (Front-End Engineering and Design) status. 
4.2.2 Storylines 
To explore the economic impacts on energy markets from the worldwide and potential 
European exploitation of unconventional gas and oil a set of four scenarios have been 
selected from the number of possible combinations described in section 3. This selection 
aims to cover as much as possible all elements of uncertainty of this analysis. Further 
sensitivity analyses on single scenario variables, i.e. all possible permutations of 
variables, may be easily developed with the current modelling setup, however they are 
not included in this report. 
Scenarios in this analysis can be distinguished to deliver i) two different stringency levels 
of climate policies, i.e. RCP 4.5 and RCP 2.6; and ii) to consider two outlooks of UH 
resources and market development, i.e. ‘High’ and ‘Low’ outlooks. The same levels of 
energy service demand projections are assumed in all scenarios, in order to enable a 
                                           
(14) Here we refer to the possible trade routes via cargo ship, which are available (e.g. MEA to/from Europe, 
etc). There’s no constraint in capacity, as these are not limited by the number of cargo ships, but by 
Liquefaction and Regasification infrastructure (see 4.2.1.5 for more information on the infrastructure). 
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direct comparison between the scenarios. Additionally, two reference scenarios are also 
presented in some of the analyses. They deliver global energy system demands at least 
cost in a business as usual setting, where there are no) climate and energy policy targets 
and under ‘High’ and ‘Low’ UH and market assumption. They are used as a reference 
case (counterfactual) against which to compare the four distinct mitigation scenarios. The 
main scenarios assumptions are listed below:  
Table 6. Summary of key scenario assumptions 
Scenario 
name 
Climate 
trajectory 
UH 
Potentials 
UH Costs 
Development 
of gas 
markets 
Demand 
Ref-Low EU reference Low Low TL (15) Low Rigid 
Ref-High EU reference High High TL High Rigid 
RCP 4.5-Low RCP 4.5 Low Low TL  Low Rigid 
RCP 4.5-High RCP 4.5 High High TL High Rigid 
RCP 2.6-Low RCP 2.6 Low Low TL Low Rigid 
RCP 2.6-High RCP 2.6 High High TL High Rigid 
4.3 Modelling results 
This section provides a detailed overview of the key modelling results. The analysis starts 
from a high-level overview of the global energy and emissions dynamics and drivers 
(section 4.3.1); then it focuses on specific dynamics on oil and gas markets (sections 
4.3.2 and 4.3.3); on LNG infrastructure (section 4.3.4); on economics of energy 
transitions (section 4.3.5). Next section 4.4 summarizes key findings on variables which 
influence future UH development.  
It is worth noting that in all the graphs contained in this section ‘Europe’ refers to the 
aggregate of the EU-28 countries, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland; unless 
otherwise stated. 
4.3.1 Global energy trends 
This section illustrates forecasted dynamics for two key energy and environmental 
variables to understand the evolution of global energy systems: the global CO2 emissions 
(Figure 35) and the global primary energy demand (Figure 36).  
In the absence of emissions mitigation actions, energy-related CO2 emissions grow 
unabated and in year 2040 the two Reference scenarios show the global energy system 
emissions at approximately 46 Gt, 47% higher than the 31 Gt in 2010. The two RCP 
mitigation scenarios show different trajectories. The less stringent mitigation scenario 
(RCP 4.5) indicates an increase of emissions in the analysed horizon, as most of global 
emissions reductions are forecasted to take place in the longer term. Emissions in 2040 
are 41.2 Gt, 32% higher than in 2010. Conversely the most stringent mitigation scenario 
(the RCP 2.6) shows a pathway where global CO2 emissions already peak by 2020 at 33 
Gt, and then rapidly decline to 17.6 Gt by 2040.  
  
                                           
(15) Technology learning 
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Figure 35. Global CO2 trajectories by scenario (Gt) 
 
Comparing emissions with energy demand demonstrates how energy consumption trends 
are not always aligned with emissions trends. In all scenarios energy demand grows 
faster than emissions, indicating a decoupling between energy consumption and 
emissions levels. This effect is marked in particular in the RCP 2.6 scenarios, where 
although global CO2 emissions reduce from 2020 onwards, primary energy demand 
increases by between 60% and 62% by 2040 (relative to 2010 levels). Although the 
causes of this decoupling will be investigated in the next sections, this is related to the 
increased end-use efficiency, fuel switching between high emissions factors fuels to lower 
emissions factors ones and renewable development. Results from Figure 36 also suggest 
that ‘high’ UH development outlooks contribute to a slight reduction of primary energy 
demand, which in 2040 results between 1.1% and 2.4% lower than their ‘low’ 
counterparts.   
Figure 36. Global primary energy demand by scenario (EJ) 
 
Looking more in detail to where energy is consumed, Figure 37 shows primary energy 
demand by region. Currently (in 2010) China, USA and Europe represent respectively 
20%, 19% and 15% of the total energy demand. All scenarios indicate that China will 
remain the largest energy consumer in future global energy market, increasing its energy 
needs by 45% and doubling by 2040. Europe shows stable demands until 2020 in all 
scenarios, then reductions of about 11% are shown in the RCP 2.6 scenarios, while RCP 
4.5 scenarios remain stable. Similarly to Europe, stricter mitigation trajectories (RCP 2.6) 
drive to lower the demand growth across the period 2020-2040 also in other model 
regions, while ‘low UH’ scenarios generally drive to slightly higher energy demands 
(between 1.3% and 2.4% higher by 2040). Energy demands in 2040 will be distributed 
as follows: China accounts for 26-27% of primary energy demand, USA for 
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approximately 12-13%, while Europe reduces to between 8 and 9% of total energy 
demand, overtook by Other Developing Asia region (9-10%).  
Natural gas has a key role on meeting this increased demand (Figure 38). Its 
consumption increases in all selected scenarios. Under ‘low’ scenarios gas supply 
increases up to 137 EJ in 2020 (35% higher than in 2010), up to 187 EJ (RCP 2.6-Low) 
and up to 193 EJ (RCP 4.5-Low) in 2040 (84% and 90% higher than in 2010). ‘High’ 
estimate scenarios show even a higher increase, i.e. +42% by 2020 relative to 2010 and 
between 113% (RCP 2.6-High) and 120% (RCP 4.5-Low) by 2040.  
Different conclusions can be drawn for other fossil fuels. Oil demand increases under the 
RCP 4.5 scenario (+20% by 2020 and +50% by 2040 in both scenarios), while under 
RCP 2.6 scenarios its demand increases until 2030 (+19% by 2020, +27% by 2030 in 
both scenarios) and then rapidly declines (-11% in RCP 2.6-High and -14% in RCP 2.6-
Low by 2040). Same conclusions can be drawn for coal, however in this case ‘high’ UH 
assessments lead to much higher demand decline.  
Renewable sources drive the transformation of the future energy system together with 
natural gas.  Renewables demand increases in all selected scenarios. The RCP 4.5 
scenarios indicate that by 2020 renewable energies will deliver between 94 and 96 EJ, 
and by 2040 between 180 and 190 EJ, equivalent to a 147% (RCP 4.5-High) and 172% 
(RCP 4.5-Low) increase relative to 2010. Even steeper increase is shown in RCP 2.6, 
where renewable energy delivers between 101 and 104 EJ in 2020, and between 303 and 
309 EJ by 2040, i.e. over 3 times the 2010 demand. 
In terms of shares, by 2040 natural gas constitutes between 24% (with low UH 
assumptions) and 29% (with high UH assumptions) of total energy supplied, while 
renewables deliver between 23% (RCP 4.5) and 41% (RCP 2.6).  
Figure 37. Global primary energy demand by region (EJ) 
 
  
49 
Figure 38. Global primary energy demand by source (EJ) 
 
4.3.2 Natural gas market outlook 
This section presents an overview of key modelling results for the gas market. Section 
4.3.2.1 focuses on gas production, 0 shows some key findings for gas demand patterns, 
4.3.2.3 discusses implications for trade and lastly 4.3.2.4 discusses the evolution of gas 
prices. 
4.3.2.1 Gas production 
The global natural gas production is projected to increase in the next decades. As today 
conventional natural gas still represents the bulk of natural gas industry activity, however 
the scenario analysis clearly indicates that unconventional gas industry will have an 
increasing role in future gas markets. Figure 39 suggests that under the most favourable 
development assumptions (RCP 4.5-High and RCP 2.6-High), the unconventional gas 
production may contribute by 2040 up to a market share of 44%-46% of overall gas 
production, remarkably higher than the 2010 production. Based on these projections 
between 46 and 51 EJ of gas will be produced from Coal-Bed-Methane (CBM), between 
28 and 30 EJ from tight gas, and between 23 and 29 EJ from shale gas. 
Figure 39. Global natural gas production by fuel (EJ) 
 
In terms of geographical distribution, Former Soviet Union (FSU), Middle East (MEA) and 
United States (USA) are forecasted to continue to have a strong role as gas producer in 
the future gas markets (Figure 40). However some new emerging regions are shown: 
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China will increase its production share to between 9% and 16%, and also Other 
Developing Asia region will have an increased share in the future gas market. In this 
context Europe, which holds a 10% market production share by 2010, will reduce its 
relative weight to between 1% and 4% by 2040. 
Figure 40. Global natural gas production shares in 2010 and 2040 
2010 
 
2040 
  
 
 
Figure 41 provides a closer look at unconventional gas production. Under less favourable 
UH development conditions (RCP 4.5-Low and RCP 2.6-Low) USA will remain, as 
currently, the world leader on unconventional gas production (between 39% and 46% of 
unconventional market share by 2040). Canada also will play a role in the market, 
delivering between 26% and 31% of total unconventional gas in the 2040. Under most 
favourable UH development conditions (RCP 4.5-High and RCP 2.6-High) unconventional 
gas production shows a further expansion, standing at 36-39 EJ by 2020 and 102-105 EJ 
by 2040. China, USA and Other Developing Asia are expected to be the main producer 
regions, accounting for between 76% and 79% of overall global unconventional gas 
production share. Unconventional gas plays a role in Europe only in the latter set of 
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scenarios. Under RCP 4.5-High unconventional gas production will contribute for 3 EJ in 
2020 and 5 EJ in 2040, while deeper mitigation target of RCP 2.6-High scenario 
negatively impacts the unconventional gas industry, which delivers 3 EJ by 2020 and 1 EJ 
by 2040. 
Figure 41. Unconventional gas production by region (EJ) 
 
Box 4. Focus on the EU-28 – Unconventional Gas production 
Observing changes in the global gas markets, a key question come to the fore. Under 
which conditions Europe may benefit on exploiting its potentials? Figure 42 and Figure 43 
shed light on the latter, showing cost-optimal unconventional gas production across the 
EU-28. Results are shown with different levels of aggregation under the two ‘High’ 
scenarios, i.e. the RCP 4.5-High and RCP 2.6-High. RCP 4.5-Low and RCP 2.6-Low are 
not shown as the exploitation of unconventional resources in Europe is not allowed by 
scenario assumption (see section 4.2.1). The exploitation of unconventional gas 
resources in the EU – in particular CBM – may contribute in the medium term (period 
2020-2030) up to 8.5%-9.5% of global unconventional gas production. Results indicate 
that a climate policy aligned with the RCP 4.5 trajectory drives to higher investments in 
the sector, while stringent mitigation pathways result in a limited development of the 
extraction activities, which will rapidly decline at the end of the modelling horizon.  
Figure 42. Unconventional gas production by fuel type in EU-28 (EJ) 
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Box 4. Focus on the EU-28 – Unconventional Gas production (continued)  
In both scenarios (Figure 43) the situation at MS level looks jeopardized. Most of the 
extraction activities would take place in few isolated countries with high differences 
between the two scenarios. This result leads to a more general conclusion that the 
industry of UH in Europe may not develop significantly, even not in the most favourable 
conditions (RCP 4.5-High).  
Figure 43. Unconventional gas production in EU-28 (%) 
 
Note: the different colours of the charts represent the shares of the unconventional gas production at MS 
level. The detail by MS is not shown here because this brief analysis wants to highlight mainly the diversity 
across EU-28. 
 
4.3.2.2 Gas demand 
Primary gas demands by model region are shown in Figure 44. Results indicate that an 
increase of gas demand is expected in most of the world regions. The most relevant 
increase is shown in China, which is expected to increase between five and ten times 
than in 2010. Interestingly, Europe shows different trajectories than other regions. Under 
the two RCP 4.5 scenarios gas demand is foreseen to remain almost stable along the 
modelled horizon. The introduction of steeper mitigation targets (RCP 2.6) indicates that 
gas may play the role of transition fuel up to 2030 and then start to decline by 2040. By 
2040 both RCP 2.6-Low and RCP 2.6-High show a decrease of approximately 52% 
compared to 2010 levels. Relatively to scenario variables, both climate and UH variables 
seem to have an important impact on future gas demand. ‘High’ UH outlooks generally 
drive higher gas demands (between 21.5% and 21.9% higher than their low counterpart 
in 2040), while steeper mitigation trajectories drive to slightly lower demands (5.3-5.5% 
lower in 2040).  
Figure 44. Primary natural gas demand by region (EJ) 
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Energy dependence, as defined as the ratio of imported energy to primary energy 
consumption, is a useful metrics to understand the evolution of specific energy markets. 
Figure 45 shows the evolution of gas import dependency in three key regions: EU-28, 
USA and China. The key findings are as follows: 
 EU-28 is currently a net gas importer, however over the modelling horizon its gas 
import dependency is foreseen to further increase in all scenarios, from 
approximately 58% in 2010 to respectively 74% in RCP 4.5-High, 86% in RCP 
2.6-High, 98% in RCP 2.6-Low and 99% in RCP 4.5-Low by 2040. Hence under 
these scenario assumptions domestic gas production is foreseen to play a very 
limited role on European gas markets and to enhance security of supply. 
 USA is currently net gas exporter. Over the long term both RCP 4.5-Low and RCP 
2.6-Low show an increase of import dependency to approximately 26-28%. Other 
scenarios indicate more stable import dependency values ranging between 9% 
and -1%. Interestingly, these modelling results point to a remarkably different 
perspective to current EIA projections (as discussed in section 2.1.1), which 
foresee USA to remain a net natural gas exporter over the next decades.  
 China will remain a net gas importer in all future scenarios, even it is foreseen to 
become one of the main gas producers (as shown in Figure 40). This means that 
the growth of gas demand in China is higher than its domestic production level. 
However from 2030, with the exception of RCP 4.5-Low scenario, a change in 
trends is shown. Import dependency start declining returning to almost current 
dependency levels. 
Figure 45. Natural Gas import dependency in EU-28, USA and China (%) 
 
4.3.2.3 Gas trade 
The shale gas resource development in the US had an impressive impact on the 
perspective US gas trade so far. As discussed in section 2.1.1, projections of natural gas 
import in the US doubled in the latest assessments (figure 4, AEO 2016), however it is 
unclear which impacts are foreseen for other world regions. (Pearson et al., 2012) 
indicates in their analysis, that global gas trade is likely to increase independently of high 
or low GDP growth or optimistic/conservative conditions for shale gas. This section 
confirms these general findings. 
The following Figure 46, Figure 47, Figure 48 and Figure 49 provide an overview of 
forecasted gas trades in 2040 under the analysed scenarios. By 2040 the least-cost 
analysis indicates that higher trades are showed under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario. 
Pipeline gas trades from Canada to USA, and from Former Soviet Union to Europe are the 
drivers of this increase; while no big changes are shown in the LNG market, where total 
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trades remain stable over the horizon. Conversely the other scenarios indicate a 
slowdown (compared to the RCP 4.5-Low) of pipeline gas trades, but an expansion of 
LNG trade. The RCP 2.6-High shows the higher LNG trade activity, driven by increase of 
exportations mostly from Australia, Former Soviet Union and Africa. Growth in LNG 
demand is shown in the four main Asian regions, i.e. China, Japan, India and South-
Korea (details of the results of LNG and pipeline can be found in Table 7).  
In this context Europe shows increasing importation levels in all scenarios till 2020, then 
stabilizes and in particular under RCP 2.6 scenarios starts to decline, driven by its 
contraction in natural gas demand (see Box 4). More information about gas trade 
dynamics for other milestone years are provided in Annex 3.  
Figure 46. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
Figure 47. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 48. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
Figure 49. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
 
Table 7. Natural gas flows in 2040 for RCP 2.6 and RCP 4.5 scenarios 
Scenario Unit Total Pipeline traded 
Pipeline traded inside EU 
(not shown in the maps) 
RCP4.5-Low  PJ 61,707 50,485 7,553 
RCP4.5-High PJ 54,386 41,464 8,597 
RCP2.6-Low PJ 56,447 44,725 4,389 
RCP2.6-High PJ 57,249 36,813 6,174 
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4.3.2.4 Gas prices 
This section presents projections for gas market prices across three main markets, 
namely market prices in the USA, Europe (16) and China (Figure 50). After a relatively 
low price period, the model projections indicate that natural gas prices will recover in all 
the main markets, achieving by 2020 values in line with ‘pre-shale gas revolution’ prices. 
Over the period 2020-2040 prices are forecasted as follows: 
 Distinctive gas price trends are shown in Europe. Since 2020, the full exploitation 
of cost-effective unconventional gas resources (‘High’ scenarios) may drive to 
lower market prices (between 34% and 38% lower than the ‘Low’ scenarios). 
Climate policies also affect gas market price policies, but only over the long term. 
By 2040 prices in RCP 2.6 and RCP 4.5 scenarios differ by 18% ‒ 25%. 
 US growth in gas market is forecasted to continue in all scenarios. As natural gas 
will be used to decarbonize the energy system, higher market prices are shown in 
the two RCP 2.6 scenario, i.e. 10.6 and 11.8 $2015/MBtu by 2040. ‘High’ UH 
development scenarios contribute to lower the gas price, given their higher 
availability of low cost natural gas. These reductions are generally about 10% in 
2040. 
 China shows similar trends to US. Natural gas is massively used to decarbonize 
the energy sector and higher market prices are shown in the RCP 2.6 scenarios. 
As in the other markets low development of gas markets drives to higher prices. 
Figure 50. Natural gas price in Europe, USA and China ($2015/MBtu) 
  
  
                                           
(16) Estimated as average prices across EU-28 MS, Switzerland, Iceland and Norway 
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4.3.3 Oil market outlook 
This section details the outlook for oil markets as resulting from the energy system least-
cost analysis. Section 4.3.3.1 presents an overview of future oil production, 0 analyses 
the evolution of oil demands across scenarios, 4.3.3.3 discusses implications for trade 
and lastly 4.3.3.4 presents the evolution of prices. 
4.3.3.1 Oil production 
The global oil production is shown in Figure 51. Under a shallow mitigation pathway (RCP 
4.5 scenarios) oil production is projected to increase in the next decades, up to 212 EJ, 
50% higher than the 2010 production. Under these scenario assumptions conventional oil 
will still represent the bulk of extracted oil, however increasing shares are expected to 
come from unconventional oils. By 2040 unconventional oil represents between 35% and 
45% of total produced oil in RCP 4.5-Low and RCP 4.5-High.  
Figure 51. Global oil production by source (EJ)  
 
Different overview is forecasted under deep mitigation scenarios (RCP 2.6). Total oil 
production will peak by 2030 and then start declining. By 2040 crude oil production is 
foreseen to reduce by 11% relatively to 2010 in RCP 2.6-High scenario, and by 14% in 
RCP 2.6-Low scenario. In this framework, unconventional oil production will have a 
central role in the market, as it will represent by 2040 between 60% and 62% of the 
crude oil market share. Unconventional production will be largely driven by extra-heavy 
oil (EHO) and oil sands production. 
Figure 52. Unconventional oil production by region (EJ) 
 
58 
In terms of geographical distribution Middle East (MEA) and Africa (AFR) are expected to 
continue to have a strong role as oil producer in all future energy scenarios (Figure 53), 
while Former Soviet Union (FSU) maintains his role only under RCP 4.5 scenarios. Under 
RCP 2.6 scenario its production dramatically reduces in 2040. Some new emerging 
players are also shown: Canada (CAN) and Central/South America (CSA), which, 
especially under RCP 2.6 scenarios, will deliver about 63% of overall production by 2040. 
Their increase in production is driven by unconventional oil production, as shown in 
Figure 53. Among all future scenarios, the role of Europe in the oil production landscape 
is negligible. 
Figure 53. Global oil production shares in 2010 and 2040 
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Box 5. Focus on the EU-28 – Unconventional Oil production 
Observing changes in the global oil markets, a key question comes to the fore. Under 
which conditions Europe may benefit on exploiting its potentials? Figure 54 and Figure 55 
shed light on it, showing cost-optimal unconventional oil production across the EU-28. 
Results are shown with different levels of aggregation under the two ‘High’ scenarios, i.e. 
the RCP 4.5-High and RCP 2.6-High. RCP 4.5-Low and RCP 2.6-Low are not shown as the 
exploitation of unconventional resources in Europe is not allowed by scenario assumption 
(see section 4.2.1).  
Figure 54. Unconventional oil production by fuel type in EU-28 (EJ) 
 
The exploitation of unconventional oil resources in the EU stay relatively low compared to 
global trends, i.e. only about 0.5%-0.9% of global unconventional oil production will be 
produced in the EU, most of which is Tight Oil production. Results indicate that a climate 
policy aligned with the RCP 4.5 trajectory drives to higher investments in the sector, 
while stringent mitigation pathways result to an even more limited development of the 
extraction activities. Under most favourable conditions (RCP 4.5-High) most of the 
extraction activities take place in the UK, Germany (DE), and the Netherlands. 
Figure 55. Unconventional oil production by MS in EU-28 (%) 
 
Note: the different colours of the charts represent the shares of the unconventional oil production at MS level. 
The detail by MS is not shown here because this brief analysis wants to highlight mainly the diversity across 
EU-28. 
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4.3.3.2 Oil demand 
Global oil demand by model region is shown in Figure 56. Results indicate that the 
increase of oil demand in the RCP 4.6 scenarios is primarily driven by increase of oil 
consumption in China, while stable demand patterns are shown in the traditionally 
biggest oil markets, such as US, Europe and Japan. The RCP 2.6 drives to a reduction of 
oil consumption from 2040. All oil markets contribute to this reduction. 
Figure 56. Primary oil demand by region (EJ) 
 
4.3.3.3 Oil trade 
The following Figure 57, Figure 58, Figure 59 and Figure 60 provide an overview of 
forecasted oil trades in 2040 under the analysed scenarios (details of the results of LNG 
and pipeline can be found in Table 8). All scenarios indicate that the crude oil trades 
exchanges will expand in the next decades, even if with different trends. Under the RCP 
4.5 mitigation pathway – where the GHG are not yet so binding – oil trades grow 
indefinitely through the whole period 2010-2040; under RCP 2.6 oil exchanges peak in 
2030 and then start to decline. By 2040 the least-cost analysis indicates that US, Europe 
and China are the game changers of the future market landscape, i.e. the decrease of 
crude oil importations to these markets correspond to the decline of the global market. 
On the supply side, the least-cost results indicate Canada and Latin America (CSA) as 
new emerging exporting actors, while traditional exporter regions, such Middle East 
(MEA), Africa (AFR) and Former Soviet Union (FSU), will see a contraction of their 
exportation shares, especially under deep mitigation scenarios. Additional information 
about oil trades for other milestone years are provided in Annex 4.   
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Figure 57. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 58. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 59. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 60. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
 
Table 8. Crude oil flows in 2040 for RCP 2.6 and RCP 4.5 scenarios 
Scenario Unit Total 
RCP4.5-Low  PJ 109,933 
RCP4.5-High PJ 106,059 
RCP2.6-Low PJ 78,577 
RCP2.6-High PJ 79,371 
63 
4.3.3.4 Oil price 
This section presents projections for oil market prices across three main markets, namely 
market prices in the USA, Europe (17) and China (Figure 61). After a relatively low oil 
price period, the model projections indicate that prices will recover in all the main 
markets, achieving by 2020 values in line with 2010 prices. Over the period 2020-2040 
prices are forecasted to remain stable or in some cases slightly reduce. Beyond 2030, the 
impact of mitigation policies drives down the oil price, in particular in the RCP 2.6 
scenarios. In detail: 
 In Europe oil prices are forecasted to range around 85$/bbl in the period 2020-
2030. Beyond 2030 different scenarios show different perspectives: RCP 2.6-Low 
and High indicates the reduced oil demand will result with a downturn of prices to 
64 $/bbl; while higher oil demands in RCP 4.5 drive to respectively stable (‘High’) 
and slightly higher (‘Low’) prices in the year 2040.  
 US oil prices peak by 2020 (between 84 and 86 $/bbl) and then is foreseen to 
decline. Deep decarbonisation pathways (i.e. RCP 2.6) contribute to lower further 
the oil price, which by 2040 reaches about 52 $/bbl in both RCP 2.6-Low and High 
scenarios. 
 China shows similar trends to US. Oil price peak by 2020 and then start to reduce 
by 2030. Reduced demands in RCP 2.6 scenarios contribute to a steep price 
reduction (nearly to the 2015 values), while in the RCP 4.5 scenarios no further 
reduction is foreseen by 2040. 
Figure 61. Oil price in Europe, USA and China ($2015/bbl) 
 
4.3.4 LNG Infrastructure 
Figure 62 provides an overview of present and future infrastructure development for LNG 
liquefaction. New investments in additional liquefaction capacities are foreseen by 2020 
across all scenarios, while over longer term new investments take place, in Former Soviet 
Union and Africa regions, only under ‘High UH growth’ scenario context. Interestingly 
under the combination of ‘high’ UH outlook and tight mitigation targets (RCP 2.6-High 
scenario), the cost optimal simulation indicates liquefaction capacity to increase up to 
23.7 EJ/y, which is 78% higher than current 13.3 EJ/y capacity.  
Looking at LNG demand infrastructure, i.e. regasification terminals, Figure 63 shows that 
the current difference in capacity between liquefaction and regasification (about two 
times in 2010 (IHS, 2015) will reduce in the two ‘Low’ scenarios, where no new 
investments are foreseen beyond 2020 and the existing capacities will not be replaced 
once at the end of technical life. Some further capacity expansion is foreseen under the 
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two ‘High’ scenarios, where by 2030 regasification capacity expands in China and Europe. 
Japan, which currently holds the largest capacity share, sees a decline of its capacity to 
about a third of the one in 2010.  
Figure 62. Gas liquefaction capacity by region (EJ-yr)18 
 
Figure 63. Gas regasification capacity by region (EJ-yr) 
 
  
                                           
(18) Europe refers here to Norway.  
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Box 6. Focus on the EU-28 – LNG Regasification capacity 
Figure 64. Regasification capacity by MS in EU-28 (%) 
 
Note: the different colours of the charts represent the shares of regasification capacity at MS level. The detail 
by MS is not shown here because this brief analysis wants to highlight mainly the diversity across EU-28 
Figure 64 provides a closer look to EU-28 regasification results. Scenarios with higher 
unconventional gas activity are likely to drive higher LNG trades between Europe and the 
rest of the world. This translates into higher investments on LNG gas trading capacity, 
i.e. regasification terminals, independently by which emissions policy is being 
implemented. Under ‘High’ scenarios LNG regasification capacity results is 2.5 times the 
one in 2010. UK, Spain and France are foreseen to deliver the biggest capacity 
expansion. It is worth noting that this is a result of a cost-optimal allocation assuming 
open market exchanges between gas import hubs and other European countries. This 
may not fully reflect the current market reality. 
4.3.5 Economics 
4.3.5.1 Investments 
Regardless of whether a deep mitigation or business-as-usual scenario applies, significant 
levels of investment will be required in the coming decades in both energy generation 
and energy using infrastructure. This includes investment in fuel production and supply, 
power generation plants, transport vehicles, heating, as well as machines and 
equipment.  
The cost of a policy scenario is the additional costs necessary to achieve the policy 
targets compared to the Reference scenario, which is illustrated in the Figure 65. The 
RCP 4.5 indicates that the total investment costs range between €23,500 billion and 
€23,600 billion by 2040, which is equivalent to a net additional investment of € 127 
billion in RCP 4.5-Low and €218 billion in RCP 4.5-High. While the total investment costs 
in the deep mitigation scenarios (RCP 2.6-Low and RCP 2.6-High) average at about 
€26,800 billion per annum in the 2040s, the net additional investment cost is between 
€3,600-3,700 billion per annum. All countries contribute to such increase in investments.  
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Figure 65. Global energy-related investments (€2010 billion) 
 
The model also has the capability of assessing investments across specific sectors or 
groups of technologies. For example, Figure 66 shows how investments for 
unconventional oil and gas extraction vary among ‘Low’ and ‘High’ scenarios. Low level of 
cost and potential outlooks along with more interconnected and open markets, namely 
‘High’ scenarios, drives up the investments in the sector (to €700-740 billion in 2040) 
almost independently from which stringency level of climate target is achieved. 
Compared to the ‘Low’ scenarios, where investments take place mostly in Canada, United 
States and Latin America , ‘High’ scenario underpins the growth on investments in new 
markets, such India, China, Mexico, Other Developing Asia and Europe.  
The increase of the global natural gas market also translates into high investments on 
infrastructures which open to new trade routes, such as LNG liquefaction and 
regasification terminals. Figure 67 indicates that investments in gas liquefaction range 
around €20-25 billion across all scenarios. However the combination of stringent 
mitigation target with ‘High’ unconventional gas outlook (i.e. RCP 2.6-High) drives the 
investments to higher levels across the whole period up to 2040, where higher 
investments take place mostly in the Former Soviet Union and Africa regions. 
Investments in the LNG regasification (see Figure 68) are almost three-fold the ones in 
the liquefaction, but from 2040, when the infrastructure is in place, they show a rapid 
decline. Largest investments take place in countries foreseen to have increased gas 
demands (see section 4.3.2) and poor pipeline interconnection with other producing 
countries such Japan, the United States, South Korea and China. Interestingly the RCP 
2.6-High scenario suggests large investments in regasification in China, underpinning a 
deep gasification of its energy system.  
  
67 
Figure 66. Investments in the unconventional oil and gas extraction (€2010 billion) 
 
 
 
Figure 67. Investments in new gas liquefaction facilities (€2010 billion) 
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Figure 68. Investments in new regasification facilities (€2010 billion) 
 
4.3.5.2 Cost of mitigation 
The achievement of an emission reduction target has an impact on the economy. 
Although our partial equilibrium model doesn’t allow determining such an impact, 
however, the solution of the model reveals an implicit carbon price (shadow price) 
associated with achieving various levels of emissions reductions and an associated total 
energy system cost that could be used to estimate the impact on the economy. Shadow 
prices in TIMES represent an estimate of the social costs (or opportunity cost) associated 
to a reduction of the GHG emissions. Results provide an indication of the costs of abating 
the last tonne of CO2 and can be used as a proxy for the level of a hypothetical carbon 
tax that may be required to reach a certain level of environmental mitigation. The energy 
system cost represents the total discounted cost of producing energy at least-cost under 
environmental and technical constraints. It includes the investment component, the 
operation and maintenance costs, the fuel costs and the residual value of technologies at 
the end of the horizon (depreciation of the invested capital). 
In the analysis presented in this report, the shadow prices per scenario for Europe and 
the Rest of World (ROW) are summarized in Table 9. A comparison of shadow prices 
between RCP 4.5-Low and LCP 4.5-High indicate similar economic challenges on 
achieving the two scenarios. Higher European CO2 abatement cost are driven by higher 
challenges on delivering current EU emissions policies for 2020, 2030 and 2040 in a 
context of a slower transition to a low carbon economy in the other regions. The RCP 2.6-
Low and LCP 2.6-High prices indicate that to move from a 41.2 Gt to a 17.6 Gt target, 
the emissions abatement cost increases sharply, illustrating the limited options available 
to deliver the final part of these challenging targets. In this case, European mitigation 
shadow prices result slightly lower than in the ROW. ‘High’ scenarios - enabling more UH 
resource development - drives to lower CO2 marginal prices given the higher availability 
of ‘cheap’ unconventional gas which drives the substitution of more carbon intensive 
fossil fuels. 
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Table 9. CO2 marginal price (€2010/tonne) 
Region Scenario 2020 2030 2040 Unit 
Europe RCP 4.5-Low 19 8 70 €2010/tonne 
 
RCP 4.5-High 16 23 75 €2010/tonne 
 
RCP 2.6-Low 20 150 686 €2010/tonne 
 
RCP 2.6-High 17 140 663 €2010/tonne 
ROW RCP 4.5-Low 0 8 29 €2010/tonne 
 
RCP 4.5-High 0 3 28 €2010/tonne 
 
RCP 2.6-Low 20 150 698 €2010/tonne 
  RCP 2.6-High 17 140 674 €2010/tonne 
Figure 69 focuses on the cost of mitigation for the RCP 4.5-Low, RCP 4.5-High, RCP 2.6-
Low and RCP 2.6-High scenarios. These have been calculated as system cost difference 
with the Reference scenarios, and they represent the additional costs driven by the 
challenges on delivering emissions mitigation targets. Results are shown for both a global 
context and Europe. A comparison of results shows completely different economic 
challenges and delivering mitigation. The RCP 4.5 scenarios indicates a cost of mitigation 
will stay below 200 € billions in both scenarios. Interestingly for Europe this leads in the 
RCP 4.5-High scenario results to a negative cost of mitigation, hence a revenue of 
approximately 26 € billions across the whole period in analysis. The cost implications of 
delivering RCP 2.6 are much more relevant. As for the RCP 4.5, the RCP 2.6-High, which 
underpins a higher outlook of UH development, will have a beneficial effect on costs. It 
enables a cost saving of about 542 € billions, out of which 64 € billions in Europe. 
Figure 69. Global and EU-28 costs of mitigation (€2010 billion) 
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4.4 Key variables influencing the development of UH 
One of the main goals of this analysis was to identify the critical variables for a structural 
change of oil and gas markets. The scenario analysis presented has assessed via a 
technology-oriented energy system model simulation the potential impacts of UH in 
future energy markets under a set of alternative scenario environments. This section 
aims to summarize qualitatively these findings. For the two key sets scenario variables, 
i.e. climate policy and high/low UH outlook, Figure 70 and Figure 71 identify implications 
for a selection of relevant energy-related indicators.  
The following headline messages can be gathered: 
 Gas production: climate targets have small impacts on future global gas 
production, while in the EU-28 production is foreseen to reduce over the long 
term. ‘High’ UH outlooks drive to higher gas extraction levels.  
 Gas demand: strong mitigation policies have the effect of reducing gas demand in 
the EU energy system by 2040, i.e. gas is used as transition fuel. For other 
realities, e.g. China or US, gas replaces other more carbon intensive fossil fuels, 
contributing to decarbonisation. 
 Oil production: climate targets drive the future oil extraction levels. Under RCP 2.6 
oil production reduces. 
 UH: unconventional gas market share increases under ‘High’ scenarios. This is not 
the case of unconventional oil, which shows higher development trends only under 
the combination of shallow mitigation climate targets and ‘High’ UH outlooks (RCP 
4.6-High). In the EU-28, the exploitation of UH resources are driven by emissions 
targets. RCP 2.6 show reduced productions. 
 Gas and Oil prices: ‘High’ UH development outlooks result in lower fuel prices. 
Stronger mitigation policies drive to higher gas prices and lower oil prices.  
 Investments: climate targets are the main drivers for increased investment levels 
in the energy system. For the EU, the deep emissions mitigation costs around 
€1,300 billion. 
 LNG infrastructure: ‘High’ UH development outlooks associated with strong 
mitigation targets lead to higher investment in LNG infrastructure. 
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Figure 70. Qualitative implications of climate policies on future Oil & Gas markets 
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Figure 71. Qualitative implications of UH development variables on future Oil & Gas markets 
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5 Conclusions 
The main goal of this report was to explore the medium and long-term implications of the 
worldwide increased development of unconventional gas and oil and their by-products on 
European market. This study has provided a detailed overview of the past and current oil 
and gas market dynamics, identified the critical variables for a structural change of oil 
and gas markets and assessed via a technology-oriented energy system models 
simulation the potential impacts of UH in future energy markets.  
The analysis may be seen as an update and follow-up of the previous JRC analysis 
published in (Pearson et al., 2012). However, this report has extended the scope of the 
analysis, i) to both unconventional oil and gas (previously only shale gas), and ii) to both 
global and EU regional dynamics (previously only global focus). 
The global energy system model JRC Energy Trade Model (JRC ETM) has been updated to 
provide a detailed scenario analysis which explores the medium and long-term potential 
development of UH at global scale, and the economic impacts of the potential European 
exploitation. The report has presented results for the period 2010–2040. It shows that an 
integrated modelling approach provides important insights into the role of key economic, 
environmental and technical variables driving the future gas and oil markets, and draws 
evidence on the economic impacts of the potential European exploitation of UH.  
The scenario analysis for four alternative scenarios has shown that: 
 The natural gas market will expand in the future years and will contribute –
replacing other more carbon intensive fossil fuels – to the decarbonisation of 
energy sectors.  
 Under scenarios with favourable unconventional gas development, natural gas 
has the potential of capturing 30% of the world’s total primary energy supply by 
2040. This would make it surpass oil as the world’s foremost source of energy. 
 Natural gas in Europe can be considered as transition fuel towards a low carbon 
economy. 
 Unconventional gas is relatively evenly dispersed around the world and the 
majority of regions will likely witness at least some level of production in the 
future. In scenarios with favourable unconventional gas development the United 
States, China and Other Developing Asia are well placed to become the top 
producers of unconventional gas. In the EU-28, the exploitation of 
unconventional gas resources is driven by emissions targets. Stricter mitigation 
policies drive to low extraction activity. The results at MS look jeopardised, 
characterized by very few countries with relatively high share of gas production 
and few others with non-significant production activities.  
 Significant unconventional gas production has the potential to lower the natural 
gas prices. 
 The global trade in natural gas will increase in any future scenario. 
Unconventional gas development, however, has the potential to moderate the 
degree of growth of pipeline trades, while interregional LNG flows increase. 
 Global oil market will expand in the medium term in all future scenarios, then 
from 2040 tighter mitigation policies may drive to a decline. In these scenarios 
with, oil reduces to 16-17% of the world’s total primary energy supply. 
Unconventional oil production will be only slightly impacted by mitigation policies, 
i.e. the relative share grows to 60-62% of total oil production by 2040.  
 Unconventional oil production will grow in the future years; however it has 
limited potential on lowering oil prices. Canada and Latin America are well placed 
to become the top producers of unconventional oil. In the EU-28 exploitation of 
unconventional oils will be very limited. 
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 The global trade in crude oil will increase in any future scenario at least in the 
medium term (till 2030). Climate policies have the potential of reducing the 
growth of trades from 2040. 
Future activities may focus on expanding the scenario analysis performed in this report to 
even more precisely assess implications of single relevant variables may have on the UH 
development and its implications on future energy and gas markets.  
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Energy Institute. University College London 
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M., G. Flato, P. Friedlingstein, C. Jones, J.-F. Lamarque, H. Liao 
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Annex 2. Types of price formation mechanisms 
Oil Price 
Escalation (OPE) 
The price is linked, usually through a base price and an escalation 
clause, to competing fuels, typically crude oil, gas oil and/or fuel 
oil. In some cases coal prices can be used as can electricity prices. 
Gas-on-Gas 
Competition 
(GOG) 
The price is determined by the interplay of supply and demand – 
gas-on-gas competition – and is traded over a variety of different 
periods (daily, monthly, annually or other periods). Trading takes 
place at physical hubs (e.g. Henry Hub) or notional hubs (e.g. 
NBP in the UK). There are likely to be developed futures markets 
(NYMEX or ICE). Not all gas is bought and sold on a short term 
fixed price basis and there will be longer term contracts but these 
will use gas price indices to determine the monthly price, for 
example, rather than competing fuel indices. Also included in this 
category is spot LNG, any pricing which is linked to hub or spot 
prices and also bilateral agreements in markets where there are 
multiple buyers and sellers. 
Bilateral Monopoly 
(BIM) 
The price is determined by bilateral discussions and agreements 
between a large seller and a large buyer, with the price being 
fixed for a period of time – typically this would be one year. There 
may be a written contract in place but often the arrangement is at 
the Government or state-owned company level. Typically there 
would be a single dominant buyer or seller on at least one side of 
the transaction, to distinguish this category from GOG, where 
there would be multiple buyers and sellers. 
Netback from 
Final Product 
The price received by the gas supplier is a function of the price 
received by the buyer for the final product the buyer produces. 
This may occur where the gas is used as a feedstock in chemical 
plants, such as ammonia or methanol, and is the major variable 
cost in producing the product. 
Regulation: Cost 
of Service 
The price is determined, or approved, by a regulatory authority, 
or possibly a Ministry, but the level is set to cover the “cost of 
service”, including the recovery of investment and a reasonable 
rate of return 
Regulation: Social 
and Political 
The price is set, on an irregular basis, probably by a Ministry, on a 
political/social basis, in response to the need to cover increasing 
costs, or possibly as a revenue raising exercise – a hybrid 
between RCS and RBC. 
Regulation: Below 
Cost (RBC) 
The price is knowingly set below the average cost of producing 
and transporting the gas often as a form of state subsidy to the 
population. 
No Price (NP) The gas produced is either provided free to the population and 
industry, possibly as a feedstock for chemical and fertilizer plants, 
or in refinery processes and enhanced oil recovery. The gas 
produced maybe associated with oil and/or liquids and treated as 
a by-product. 
Source: From IGU Wholesale Gas Price Survey International Gas Union- 2015 Edition 
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Annex 3. Natural gas trades dynamics 19 
Figure 72. Natural gas flows in 2010 (PJ) 
 
Figure 73. Natural gas flows in 2020 under the Reference-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
                                           
(19) Maps represent flows >100 PJ. 
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Figure 74. Natural gas flows in 2030 under the Reference-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 75. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the Reference-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 76. Natural gas flows in 2020 under the Reference-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 77. Natural gas flows in 2030 under the Reference-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 78. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the Reference-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 79. Natural gas flows in 2020 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 80. Natural gas flows in 2030 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 81. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 82. Natural gas flows in 2020 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 83. Natural gas flows in 2030 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 84. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 85. Natural gas flows in 2020 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 86. Natural gas flows in 2030 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 87. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 88. Natural gas flows in 2020 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 89. Natural gas flows in 2030 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 90. Natural gas flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
 
Table 11. Natural gas flows in 2010, and in 2020, 2030, 2040 for reference scenario, RCP 2.6 and 
RCP 4.5  
Scenario Year Unit Total 
Pipeline 
traded 
Pipeline traded inside EU 
(not represented on the 
maps) 
Reference 2010 PJ 39,931 27,069 8,464 
Reference-Low 2020 PJ 44,922 32,564 10,973 
Reference-Low 2030 PJ 52,783 40,688 9,171 
Reference-Low 2040 PJ 58,913 47,941 7,548 
Reference-High 2020 PJ 45,512 32,174 10,392 
Reference-High 2030 PJ 49,907 35,497 8,910 
Reference-High 2040 PJ 53,644 42,027 8,218 
RCP4.5-Low 2020 PJ 44,844 32,437 10,848 
RCP4.5-Low 2030 PJ 51,883 39,637 8,629 
RCP4.5-Low 2040 PJ 61,707 50,485 7,553 
RCP4.5-High 2020 PJ 45,615 31,977 10,471 
RCP4.5-High 2030 PJ 54,314 38,773 9,034 
RCP4.5-High 2040 PJ 54,386 41,464 8,597 
RCP2.6-Low 2020 PJ 47,041 33,893 11,584 
RCP2.6-Low 2030 PJ 55,745 38,856 8,314 
RCP2.6-Low 2040 PJ 56,447 44,725 4,389 
RCP2.6-High 2020 PJ 48,553 32,394 10,790 
RCP2.6-High 2030 PJ 63,060 39,602 10,745 
RCP2.6-High 2040 PJ 57,249 36,813 6,174 
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Annex 4. Crude oil trades dynamics20 
Figure 91. Crude oil flows in 2010 (PJ) 
 
Figure 92. Crude oil flows in 2020 under the Reference-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
                                           
(20) Maps represent flows >100 PJ. 
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Figure 93. Crude oil flows in 2030 under the Reference-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 94. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the Reference-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 95. Crude oil flows in 2020 under the Reference-High scenario (PJ) 
  
 
Figure 96. Crude oil flows in 2030 under the Reference-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 97. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the Reference-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 98. Crude oil flows in 2020 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 99. Crude oil flows in 2030 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 100. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 101. Crude oil flows in 2020 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 102. Crude oil flows in 2030 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 103. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 4.5-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 104. Crude oil flows in 2020 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 105. Crude oil flows in 2030 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 106. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-Low scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 107. Crude oil flows in 2020 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
 
 
Figure 108. Crude oil flows in 2030 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
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Figure 109. Crude oil flows in 2040 under the RCP 2.6-High scenario (PJ) 
 
Table 12. Crude oil flows in 2010, and in 2020, 2030, 2040 for reference scenario, RCP 2.6 and 
RCP 4.5 
Scenario Year Unit Total 
Reference 2010 PJ 74,530 
Reference-Low 2020 PJ 78,628 
Reference-Low 2030 PJ 97,145 
Reference-Low 2040 PJ 111,599 
Reference-High 2020 PJ 78,023 
Reference-High 2030 PJ 91,094 
Reference-High 2040 PJ 99,125 
RCP4.5-Low 2020 PJ 78,589 
RCP4.5-Low 2030 PJ 98,481 
RCP4.5-Low 2040 PJ 109,933 
RCP4.5-High 2020 PJ 78,255 
RCP4.5-High 2030 PJ 88,836 
RCP4.5-High 2040 PJ 106,059 
RCP2.6-Low 2020 PJ 80,204 
RCP2.6-Low 2030 PJ 98,624 
RCP2.6-Low 2040 PJ 78,577 
RCP2.6-High 2020 PJ 80,302 
RCP2.6-High 2030 PJ 99,838 
RCP2.6-High 2040 PJ 79,371 
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